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RANDOMIZATION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares
I. Introduction
In the eyes of most jurists and constitutional
commentators, checkpoint searches symbolize the exact
antitheses of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. No
matter whether the checkpoints operate on a randomized or
exhaustive basis, whether they entail immediate searches
or discretionary referrals to a secondary site, courts and
commentators typically use the checkpoint to illustrate
police searches that do not satisfy a central requirement of
the Fourth Amendment—namely, individualized suspicion.
Justice O’Connor sums up the standard view: “For most of
our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches
have been generally considered per se unreasonable within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”3 Naturally, there
are exceptions in cases of exigent circumstances—an
emergency road block designed to catch a fleeing felon is
one notable example—but under ordinary circumstances,
checkpoints are almost universally condemned for violating
the central tenet of individualized suspicion that lies at the
heart of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
The problem with this conventional account is that it
conflates the suspicionless nature of the checkpoint search
with the randomized aspect of the search. The two
ingredients—lack of suspicion and randomization—are
collapsed in the constitutional analysis, as if “random”
necessarily means “suspicionless.” This conflation is
illustrated well in the constitutional debates over random
drug testing, border patrol checkpoints, and administrative
inspections, where the controversy inevitably turns on the
costs to privacy of having suspicionless searches versus the
benefits of evenhandedness that flow from randomized
searches.
The
conflation
of
the
suspicion
and
randomization elements ultimately reinforces the negative
view of checkpoint searches.
We take a different view: we contend, first, that the
model of the checkpoint should serve as the loadstar for
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and that the
concept of “individualized suspicion” should be, well,
3

Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 669 (1995) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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abandoned. Randomization is crucial to promoting the
value of evenhandedness, which is necessary to achieve the
goal of controlling discretion, a goal that lies at the very
heart of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. We also argue,
second, that randomized searches by definition are
accompanied by a certain level of suspicion. The
constitutional issue, we maintain, should not turn on the
question of suspicion-based versus suspicionless police
encounters with individuals, but on the level of suspicion
that attaches to any search program and on the
evenhandedness of the program. In essence, we argue for a
new paradigm of randomized encounters that satisfy a base
level of suspicion in order to capture the benefits of both
privacy-protection (by ensuring a minimum level of
suspicion) and evenhandedness (by cabining police
discretion).
The notion of reasonableness at the core of the
Fourth Amendment has a few aims. Two of the most
important are controlling police discretion and avoiding
discrimination, whether political, racial, or other. Our
contention, primarily, is that the Fourth Amendment ought
to be interpreted in a way that best constrains police power
and makes it politically accountable to those against whom
it is being deployed. In emphasizing discretion and
discrimination, we do not mean to slight privacy protection.
We think randomization protects privacy by ensuring an
honest and open evaluation of the level of suspicion
necessary to trigger the possibility of police intervention
and coercion.
We begin by noting that the “individualized
suspicion” concept is based on a faulty understanding of
suspicion. The term “individualized suspicion,” which was
born relatively recently in the 1960s, has become today a
placeholder for the conclusion that a search or seizure is
constitutional. As such, the term masks the level of
suspicion that courts do and should demand in police
encounters, and it undermines the value of requiring
suspicion as a protection of privacy interests.
To
be
more
precise,
Fourth
Amendment
jurisprudence has been constructed using an inaccurate
model of suspicion. The model is inaccurate in at least two
ways. First, the term “individualized suspicion” is
misleading in that it implies that suspicion is either
individualized and meets constitutional requirements, or it
is not. The term implies that the process of suspicion-based
judgments is binary. In reality, suspicion is a probabilistic
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concept. It is, in technical terms, a continuous variable, not
a categorical one. Second, the term is misleading in another
way because it suggests that law enforcers come to
judgments about individuals by evaluating unique
individual traits. In reality, most individuals become
suspicious because of the group-based type behavior that
they exhibit or the fact that they belong readily identifiable
groups—sex and age are two examples—rather than
because of unique individual traits. Typically, individuals
come to police attention because they are young, or are
male, or are running away from the police, or have a bulge
in their pocket. To be sure, there are cases when suspicion
attaches to an individual because of his or her unique
identification. Arrests warrants executed for a fugitive of the
law are the best example, and the case of Roman Polanski
comes to mind here. But these cases obviously are rare in
contrast to the more typical police-civilian encounter. Let
us explain.
First, the proper way to think about suspicion is with
reference to a probability scale of 0 to 1, not as
individualized or not. Consider a case in which a police
officer sees a known batterer assaulting his wife. The level
of suspicion regarding the batterer is high, at or very close
to 1 on a probability scale. Similarly, when Roman Polanski
is identified at the airport in Switzerland on the basis of his
passport and matched—by full name, date of birth, place of
birth, etc.—to an outstanding arrest warrant, the level of
4
suspicion is again high, at or very close to 1. Now consider
a case in which a police officer observes an AfricanAmerican man whose measured pacing, peering, and
conferring make the police officer suspicious that he might
be engaged in or preparing to commit a crime. The level of
suspicion the officer has regarding this suspect is lower
5
than in the first two cases we’ve described. Note, though,
that a court utilizing a binary “individualized suspicion”
standard would find individualized suspicion in all of these
cases. In fact, the Supreme Court found individualized
suspicion on the facts of the third case in Terry v. Ohio.
Note, too, that the binary metric of “individualized
suspicion” does not give courts a way to distinguish among
these cases and does not compel courts to spell out how
4

Naturally, someone else who resembles Polanski may have stolen his passport
and be impersonating Polanski, so the level of suspicion is never really 1. But it
is very close in that case.
5
We refer here, obviously, to the facts recounted by Officer McFadden to justify
his stop and search of John W. Terry in the famous case of Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968).

5
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much suspicion is necessary to trigger a justifiable stop or
arrest. As it is commonly employed, the “individualized
suspicion” standard provides courts only the option of
coding these very different encounters “0” or “1,” without
realistically giving any guidance as to the quantum of
6
suspicion necessary to delineate the binary “1.”
Second, the most natural way to think about
suspicion is in terms of group-based identifiers. For the
most part, suspicion attaches to group-based traits,
conditions, and behaviors: the police identify sets of
individuals with motives, individuals who match a drugcourier profile, individuals who fit an eye-witness
description, individuals who are in a specific location, or
individuals who have the same blood type. In the Terry
case, for instance, Officer McFadden became suspicious of
the suspects there because they displayed a number of
behaviors that McFadden, through his years of experience,
had come to equate with criminal behavior: walking back
and forth, looping back to a location, looking around
7
furtively. In other cases, suspicion attaches to the
individual who has a bulge in his pants pocket, who fits a
description in the vicinity of a recently committed offense,
who throws away a plastic vial at the sight of a police patrol
car, or who has Florida license plates on the New Jersey
Turnpike. These are group-based determinations, and
suspicion potentially attaches to all individuals within those
categories. Suspicion in these cases is “individualized” only
in the sense in that it attaches to an individual because he
or she is a member of the suspect group. In other words, in
most cases of policing, suspicion does not originate at the
individual level.

6

To be sure, the courts could distinguish between more or less suspicion in
these cases and could allow an arrest in the first two, but only a stop-interrogateand-frisk in the third. The courts might intervene to weigh the amount of
intrusion of the search or seizure against the amount of evidence of suspicion.
But in all these cases, police intervention and coercion is constitutionally
permitted because the constitutional standard of “individualized suspicion,”
though indeterminate, undefined, and unquantified, has been met. By contrast, if
a court were to utilize a probabilistic spectrum standard in these cases, the court
would have to clearly identify the quantum of suspicion in each case and
determine whether that quantum satisfies constitutional requirements based on a
measured comparison between the quantum in those cases and the level of
suspicion necessary to satisfy the constitutional values underlying the Fourth
Amendment. The court would have to code the cases along a continuous scale
and would have to specify what amount of suspicion satisfies the constitutional
mandate.
7
392 U.S. at 5-7.
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By modeling suspicion with respect to a binary
standard rather than to the more realistic probabilistic one,
courts have created a mismatch between Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence and everyday police work. As an
empirical matter, only a small fraction of police practice
involves retrospective criminal investigations in which law
enforcement officers have sufficient information to identify
one individual—“the one who did it.” Very few cases involve
police officers witnessing a known culprit engaging in
8
crime. In reality, police practice is dominated by
discretionary decisions about whom to stop and investigate
based on leads and suspicious behavior—prospective and
preventative actions that are based on levels of suspicion
far short of “1.” In the vast majority of cases, what we really
want to know is whether there is enough suspicion (in
probability terms) to conclude that the Constitution has
been satisfied. To use existing language, what we want to
know is that there is “individualized suspicion” in the
binary sense.
It is true that if law enforcement officers were
authorized to act only when presented with a case in which
the offender and crime were clearly identified—where the
level of suspicion is close to “1”—then the binary model
would fit police work more comfortably and would help
guide police officers and courts reviewing police officers’
actions. But that is far from the case. As we detail below,
the vast majority of police work is made up of interactions
with individuals in which the level of suspicion falls well
below “1,” and there the binary model the courts employ
offers no guidance to the law enforcers subject to it.
Let us take a moment here to be clear: we do not
believe that the “individualized suspicion” standard is too
stringent or that it asks for too much or too high a degree of
suspicion. The problem is not that the binary model
requires that there be practical certainty in all cases—that
the level of suspicion reach “1.” (It should be obvious that it
does not, as evidenced by the rule that Terry stops satisfy
individualized suspicion.) To the contrary, the problem is
that the binary model does not specify in any way what
level of suspicion the Constitution requires, and therefore
8

To be sure, in those very few cases, there would be good reason to use a binary
standard as the model of suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Such a binary
standard would fit those exceptional cases comfortably, because in those cases,
the binary and the spectrum essentially coincide. In those cases, the level of
suspicion is practically a “1” on the probability scale and is certainly a “1” in
binary terms. But those are the exceptional cases—and they distort the
functioning of the Fourth Amendment.

7
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courts have completely punted the question. The binary
model is essentially unidentified, and so it offers no
guidance to the police to insure that their decisions
comport with the Constitution. By contrast, we will detail
here a model of suspicion that realistically produces an
explicit analysis of the amount of suspicion needed in any
9
police case.
Another way to say this—a more legally stylized way,
perhaps—is that the “individualized suspicion” standard
relies on a “Warrant Model” of reasonable searches that is
entirely out of step with ordinary policing, which is
characterized in truth by a “Patrol Model,” and that the
clash between the two models undermines the
constitutional standard of reasonableness. Drawing
metaphorically on the structure of the Fourth Amendment
text itself, it is possible to think of the constitutional
provision as itself containing two models—a Patrol Model
and a Warrant Model. The text of the amendment, as we all
10
know, contains two clauses. The first clause goes to the
larger issue of reasonableness; the second, to the
requirement that warrants issue only on probable cause.
Our contention is that the Court has created the
“individualized suspicion” requirement in the image of the
second clause and embraced a Warrant Model—one in
which the police must be able to describe with particularity
the individual or things to be searched or seized. But in so
doing, the Court has created a fictional rubric of
“individualized suspicion” that does more harm than good.
9

One further clarification: If someone were to respond here that individualized
suspicion is not “1” on the probability scale, but “0.5,” and therefore that
individualized suspicion is, in effect, an expression of the probability scale we
urge courts to use, we would emphasize again that, especially on that
understanding, the term “individualized suspicion” is being used in a conclusory
manner—it overlaps completely with “constitutional” or “reasonable” suspicion.
It does no independent work at all. What then is the point of using the term
“individualized suspicion”? Why not call it “constitutional” or “reasonable
suspicion” tout court? Our point is that it is far better for the police, for citizens,
and for the courts to define the level of suspicion that attaches to any particular
situation and to use that probabilistic approach to suspicion to address the
constitutional question whether there is reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify
a stop.
10

“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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Instead of ensuring a heightened requirement for police
encounters, the standard actually masks the required level
of suspicion in most cases. We think that the Court should
instead craft a standard of reasonableness driven by the
Patrol Model of policing, which is the reality on the street.
Such a standard would be tied to the first clause of the
Fourth Amendment and would assess reasonableness in
light of the amount of suspicion underlying a search or
seizure and also with reference to the extent of
evenhandedness law enforcers employ when engaging in
11
searches and seizures.
Nothing about what we have said so far requires that
we advocate for randomization, of course. We could simply
urge that courts use a more honest metric of suspicion and
stop there. We promote the concept of randomization for
two reasons: First, because suspicion predominantly
attaches to groups, at least in the ordinary policing context.
When we require a certain level of suspicion, it turns out,
we have identified a group of individuals—generally, a
group that contains individuals of different races,
ethnicities, gender, etc. In order to pick from within that
group—all of whom satisfy the required level of suspicion—
we ought to use a neutral sorting mechanism. We must
pick fairly from the group. Once we have decided to search
within any category, we are in effect searching within the
group. The only way to do that without injecting bias and
prejudice is to randomly search the group because
randomization allows us to select from the group while
avoiding illegitimate criteria to discriminate within the
group.
Second, and relatedly, randomization allows for
perfectly representative sampling within a group. The only
way to obtain a fair and representative sample within a
group that does not skew on other dimensions is to use a
randomization mechanism. Suspicion-sufficient checkpoints help to ensure that the population touched by
policing (the population with police and correctional
contacts) will reflect accurately the offending population. As
we explain in greater detail below, suspicion-sufficient
checkpoints
avoid
the
risk
of
ratchets
and
disproportionality in the arrestee, jail, or prison
11

One other option going forward, naturally, would be to tack more closely to
the Warrant Clause and actually require warrant-like specificity and probable
cause for all police-civilian encounters. That would require reversing Terry, the
Court’s jurisprudence on articulable suspicion, and strengthening or defining the
level of suspicion required by “probable cause.”

9
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populations. What the checkpoint can provide is an
updated and accurate profile of the offending population—a
12
snapshot of offender distributions. And that, we believe,
promotes the values at the heart of the Fourth Amendment
and of due process, values that require the state to treat all
similarly situated individuals—here, offenders—similarly.
In this essay, we argue that the expression
“individualized suspicion” should be abandoned. But we
also go further and suggest that randomized stops at
suspicion-sufficient checkpoints should be the focal point of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness: that randomized
engagement of citizens offers a better constitutional model
for controlling the exercise of police power against
individuals.
We want to emphasize here that this argument does
not require that we promote suspicionless searches and
seizures. Quite to the contrary, the motivation to eliminate
the
term
“individualized
suspicion”
from
Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence is precisely in order to focus the
relevant actors’ attention on the amount of suspicion
necessary
for
constitutionally-justified
police-civilian
encounters. We advocate a model of randomized searches
within groups of individuals who all satisfy a threshold level
of suspicion consistent with Fourth Amendment values. A
threshold level of suspicion is a critical element to satisfy
the constitutional mandate “against unreasonable searches
13
and seizures.” The amount of suspicion, not the concept of
individualized suspicion, protects our privacy, and the
method of randomization, not retrospective judicial
supervision of discretion, will ensure reasonable searches
and seizures.
12

In most cases, the construction of profiles is actually based on random
sampling. That was the idea, for instance, behind the IRS audits that were
conducted to create the “Discriminant Index Function” (“DIF”) used to flag
likely tax evaders. The DIF was last updated in 1992 based on a multipleregression analysis of approximately 50,000 tax returns that had been randomly
audited in 1988. By using random sampling, the IRS can obtain an accurate
picture of suspicious traits at a particular point in time. To be sure, there are
dangers in using profiles prospectively if the targeted population is less elastic to
policing than the non-targeted population. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt,
Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age
(Chicago 2007). So using the information prospectively may not be wise. But
what the randomization unquestionably affords is an accurate snapshot of the
offending population, and it ensures that the carceral population will accurately
reflect all distributions within the offending population.

13

U.S. Const. Amend. IV.
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Two additional observations. First, where that
reasonable level of suspicion should lie is a matter that
should be addressed by the United States Supreme Court
in dialogue with the American people. Accordingly, we will
take no position on the matter here. The fact that this issue
has never been squarely addressed by the Court and that,
still today, we have no good idea how much suspicion is
enough to satisfy the constitutional standards of probable
cause or articulable suspicion (under Terry) is the best
evidence of the damage that the concept of “individualized
suspicion” has wreaked.
Second, the level of suspicion that attaches to a
randomized search program may often—but will not
always—be able to be determined ex ante. Once a
randomized search program has been put in place, it will be
possible to predict the level of suspicion that will likely
attach to future searches. However, there will be times
when randomized search programs are implemented
without first knowing the exact level of suspicion attached
to the program. In such cases, a compensatory system
should be implemented to provide damages (on a
workman’s compensation model) for the set of individuals
ultimately burdened by an unreasonable (insufficient
14
suspicion) checkpoint search.
We begin by discussing the real world and workload
of police officers, as a way to set forth, more precisely, our
model of suspicion. We then turn to the constitutional
doctrine and demonstrate how our proposal accords with
Fourth Amendment values. Using a case that illustrates the
contour of our argument, Indianapolis v. Edmond, we
explore what it means to model searches on a suspicionsufficient randomization paradigm. Our argument about
why randomization, and not individualization, is the most
helpful construct for Fourth Amendment reasonableness
comes next. Finally, while it is especially important to
distinguish between the constitutional question of
reasonableness and the public policy question of efficient
policing, we explore some objections and implementation
issues. It is not always the case that constitutional
requirements and good public policy will necessarily
overlap; however, we believe our constitutional paradigm
allows for best police practices. Naturally for our paradigm
to work well, a great deal will turn on the pool that is
14

We are not the first to advocate compensating individuals for police
encounters, (see Lempert, others) but combining a compensation scheme with
randomization is new.

11
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constructed for purposes of randomization, and so we
discuss in some detail the pooling issues. We also offer a
number of examples. One preliminary is clear to us though:
in order to render possible those best practices, a judicial
commitment to a new constitutional paradigm of
randomization is necessary.
II. Grounded Theory: The Reality of Police Practices
In 2006, NYPD police officers in New York City
15
stopped, questioned, and frisked 508,540 people. In 2007,
the NYPD frisked close to 30,000 more people—531,159—a
record, but one was short-lived. For the calendar year 2009,
the NYPD stopped and interrogated a remarkable 575,304
16
persons. And 2010 promises to break even that record.
By contrast, adult felony arrests in New York City
represent a fraction—approximately one-fifth—of these
numbers. In 2006, there were 97,158 felony arrests of
adults, of which 27,516 were related to violent crime and
29,053 to drug-related offenses—and some number of these
17
grew out of the stop and frisk practices; in 2008, there
were 100,043 felony arrests of adults, which included
18
28,296 violent and 28,765 drug-related offenses.
There is also a Violent Felony Warrant Squad in the
NYPD that tracks down individuals wanted on felony
15

Summary of the RAND Report on NYPD’s Stop, Question, and Frisk: Hearing
Before the New York City Council Committee on Public Safety and Committee
on Civil Rights (Apr. 30, 2009) (statement of Greg Ridgeway, Director of the
Safety and Justice Research Program and Director of the Center on Quality
Policing,
RAND
Corporation),
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT329.pdf; see also New
York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”), NYPD Stop & Frisk Information,
http://www.nyclu.org/stopandfrisk (last visited Oct. 4, 2009).
16
See http://www.nyclu.org/issues/racial-justice/stop-and-frisk-practices; see
also NYPD, New York City Police Department Stop Question & Frisk Activity:
Reports prepared during the period January 1 through Mar 31, 2009 (“NYPD
Report”),
http://www.nyclu.org/files/NYPD_Stop-andFrisk_Report_1stQtr2009.pdf ; NYCLU, Record Number of Innocent New
Yorkers
Stopped,
Interrogated
by
NYPD,
May
12,
2009,
http://www.nyclu.org/node/2389.
17
See New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services, Adult Arrests New
York City: 1999-2008,
http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/arrests/nyc.htm (last visited Oct. 4,
2009).
18
Id. There were twice as many adult misdemeanor arrests during the relevant
periods in New York City—206,259 in 2006 and 233,291 in 2008—but those
are far more analogous to order-maintenance policing and the stop-and-frisk
model than they are to adult felony arrest practices. Id.
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warrants in New York City, but its numbers are miniscule
in comparison to the ordinary felony arrests. The New York
State Police has a Violent Felony Warrant Squad that works
in cooperation with every city and local police department
in the state of New York, and in 2000, for instance, it
19
arrested 982 persons for violent felonies across the state.
In other words, more than half a million people were
stopped-and-frisked under a Patrol Model in New York City,
while less than a thousand persons were arrested under the
paradigmatic Warrant Model in the entire state of New
York.
Even more telling than the raw numbers are the
reasons given for stops, questions, and frisks by the NYPD.
The NYPD report for the first quarter of 2009 lists reasons
for stops, reasons for frisks, reasons for full searches, and
20
additional circumstances that attached to the incident.
The following table summarizes the totals for each category.
What is striking is how many of the suspicion categories are
group-based.
Table: Reasons for Stop
REASON FOR STOP
Carrying Suspicious Object
Fits A Relevant Description
Casing A Victim Or Location
Suspect Acting As A Lookout
Suspicious Bulge
Other
Actions Indicative Of A Drug Transaction
Furtive Movements
Actions Of Engaging In A Violent Crime
Wearing Clothes Commonly Used In A Crime

19

NUMBER OF
STOPS
4,122
23,053
51,015
30,121
16,552
34,708
16,124
81,692
14,479
8,856

See New York State Division of State Police, State Police Violent Felony
Warrant Squad arrest wanted felon, the third in 48 hours, July 12, 2001,
http://www.troopers.state.ny.us/Public_Information/2001_News_Releases/071201_State_Police_Violent_Felony_Warrant_Squad_arrest_wanted_felon,_the_thi
rd_in_48_hours.cfm; see also Patrice O’Shaughnessy, Warrant Squad cops
track worst felons, N. Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 20, 2008,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2008/01/20/2008-0120_warrant_squad_cops_track_worst_felons-3.html#ixzz0SQZa3P3O.
20
See NYPD Report, supra note 16, at 334-35.

13
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Table: Reasons for Frisk
REASON FOR FRISK
Inappropriate Attire For Season
Verbal Threats By Suspect
Knowledge Of Suspect's Prior Criminal Behavior
Other Suspicion Of Weapons
Furtive Movements
Actions Of Engaging In A Violent Crime
Refuse To Comply W/ Officer's Directions
Violent Crime Suspected
Suspicious Bulge

NUMBER OF
FRISKS
15,119
1,027
2,223
6,005
64,068
10,822
16,874
18,753
15,900

Table: Basis for Search
BASIS FOR SEARCH
Hard Object
Admission By Suspect
Outline Of Weapon
Other

NUMBER OF
SEARCHES
8,122
548
1,090
6,300

Table: Additional Circumstances
ADDITIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
Report By Victim/Witness
Area Has High Crime Incidence
Time Of Day Fits Crime Incidence
Proximity To Scene Of Offense
Associating With Known Criminals
Other

NUMBER OF
CASES
17,247
97,170
66,996
30,563
5,902
5,568

Evasive Response To Questioning

33,949

Change Direction At Sight Of Officer

43,565

Ongoing Investigation
Sights Or Sounds Of Criminal Activity
Radio Run

21,301
3,789
40,917

These tables demonstrate well that policing is
dominated by group-based determinations of suspicion.
A. Studies of Police Workload
The place to begin, then, is to look at what the police
do on the ground. Here, the data from New York City are
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entirely consistent with the best available research, which
suggests
that
order-maintenance
and
preventative
policing—the Patrol Model—by far trumps policing tasks
directed to the investigation of serious crimes—the Warrant
Model.
Policing strategies in the United States have varied
over time. An earlier era of “beat policing” was replaced in
the 1960s and 1970s—in large part because of perceived
problems of corruption—with a more professionalized model
of policing based on heavy reliance on patrol cars and
dispatching of officers through 911-reponse mechanisms.
The 1980s, however, saw the pendulum swing back to beat
policing through the concept of “community policing” that
eventually swept jurisdictions across the country and, now,
21
is viewed as the dominant and preferred model of policing.
The result is that, today, policing agencies claim a greater
commitment to community-oriented policing than they did
22
thirty years ago.
Much of the research on police workload was
conducted during the period of professionalized policing in
the 1960s and 70s.23 The lessons from those earlier studies
are consistent with and document two important facts
about ordinary policing both in urban and rural settings:
First, that police officers spend only a small fraction of their
time in contact with civilians on the street—far less time
than we tend to imagine. As one researcher in the field
comments, “A major theme of the earliest studies
concerning urban police officer workload involved dispelling
21

Cite Moore here plus recent Mastrofski piece on prevalence, Stephen
Mastrofski, et al., The Challenges of Implementing Community Policing in the
United States, 1 Policing 223-234 (2007)
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See, generally, Roger B. Parks, Stephen Mastrofski, Christina DeJong, and M.
Kevin Gray, How officers spend their time with the community, Justice
Quarterly, 16(3): 483-518 (1999); Gordon P. Whitaker, What Is Patrol Work?
Police Studies 4(4): 13-22 (Winter 1982).
23
See Brad W. Smith, Kenneth J. Novak, and James Frank, Community policing
and the work routines of street-level officers, Criminal Justice Review, 26(1): 17
(2001). These early workload studies include E. Cummings, I. Cummings, and
L. Edell, Policeman as a philosopher, friend, and guide, Social Problems, 12:
276-86 (1965); Thomas E. Bercal, Calls for police assistance: consumer
demands for government service, American Behavioral Scientist, 13: 680-90
(1970); John A. Webster, Police task and time study, Journal of Criminal Law,
Criminology, and Police Science, 94-100 (1970); Albert J. Reiss Jr., The Police
and the Public (Yale 1971); Gary W. Cordner, Police patrol work load studies,
Police Studies, 2, 50-60 (1979); Steve Mastrofski, The Police and Non-crime
Services, in Evaluating Performance of Criminal Justice Agencies 33-62
(Gordon Whitaker and Charles Phillips eds., 1983).
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the popular myth that police spend most of their time
protecting the ‘thin blue line’ between law and order . . . by
highlighting the predominance of time spent performing
24
service and order maintenance functions.” The second
consistent finding is that, of that small portion of their
workload dedicated to crime fighting, police officers spend a
greater share in their order-maintenance capacity than in
their crime-solving capacity. The early studies, in effect,
revealed that police officers spent little of their time in
reactive crime-solving activities.25 Since the advent of
community policing, a number of studies have returned to
the workload question in part to determine whether
community-oriented officers are in fact more involved with
the community and perform even more service-oriented
26
tasks.
The Warrant Model and the Patrol Model of policing
do not perfectly map onto the workload studies we will
review here because the research categories are a bit larger
and broader. Nevertheless, it is possible to find relatively
good proxies for these two different models, and when we
do, it is clear that the Patrol Model dominates the Warrant.
dominant. Even a crude measure of police tasks makes
clear that police officers today spend a greater amount of
their time in the kind of preemptive, preventative, and
investigative type of policing activities that are associated
with group-probability assessments, than they spend in the
kind of crime-response or warrant-execution types of
activities that are associated with defined or identified
suspicion. We review three recent studies here.
One of the most reliable and interesting studies
details and compares the workload of community-oriented
police officers (known as “COP officers”) to more traditional
crime-solving police officers (known as “beat officers”) in the
same police department in Cincinnati, Ohio. The data were
collected using systematic social observation—actual
observations of police officers by trained social scientists—
during a 13-month period from April 1997 through April
24

John Liederbach, Addressing the “elephant in the living room”: An
observational study of the work of suburban police, Policing 28(3): 417 (2005).
25
See Cummings, Cummings, and Edell, supra note 23, at 276-86; Bercal, supra
note 23, at 680-90; Reiss, supra note 23; Webster, supra note 23 at 94-100.
26
See Smith, Novak, and Frank, supra note 23, at 17-37; Parks, Mastrofski.
Dejong, and Gray, supra note 22, at 483-518; Liederbach, supra note 24, at 41534; James Frank, Steven G. Brandl, and R. Cory Watkins, The content of
community policing: a comparison of the daily activities of community and
“beat officers,” Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategy and
Management, 20(4): 716-28 (1997).
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1998. In all, the researchers studied 31 different COP
officers over 1,648 hours and 131 different beat officers
over 1,888 hours, spanning a total of 442 police shifts over
3,536 hours. The researchers coded the work activities of
the observed officers minute-by-minute by 125 different
categories of activities and encounters. The activities
categories were defined as non-contact as they included
behaviors that did not involve face-to-face interaction with
civilians. The encounter categories, on the other hand,
involved personal interactions between a police officer and a
citizen. Every minute of an observed police officer’s activity
was coded using 23 different activity categories and 102
different encounter categories. These categories were then
aggregated into a 16-category list of workload, ranging from
“personal” and “en route/waiting” to “administrative,”
“order maintenance,” or “ordinance enforcement.”
27

For our purposes, the most important categories are
the encounter categories that involve, on the one hand,
“crime incidents,” and on the other hand “investigative,”
“order-maintenance,” and “traffic enforcement.” The first
category, “crime incidents,” corresponds more closely to our
model of warrant policing. It does not map on exactly and is
probably broader, but it is the closest category. It is defined
as “Activities involving a response to a violation of criminal
law, for example searching property, serving warrants, or
28
Serving
responding to crime calls (e.g., burglary).”
warrants, clearly, maps on well to our category, but
responding to crime calls is also more likely to trigger
encounters with identified suspects, especially in domestic
abuse cases or where there are acquaintance crimes. The
second category is intended to get at more proactive police
tasks that tend to include stops, questioning, and frisks—
and more closely maps on to our model of patrol policing.
This category includes three rubrics: the first,
“Investigative,” is defined as “Activities involving an
unknown problem (e.g., checking out suspicious
circumstances, alarm response, or interrogation)”; the
second, “Order-maintenance,” is defined as “Proportion of
time spent on activities intended to maintain or restore
order, such as attempting to keep the peace and dealing
with public nuisance problems (i.e., disorderly, drunk,
noise disturbance, or arguments)”; and the third, “Traffic
enforcement,” is defined as “Activities involving vehicles or

27
28
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the roadways, for example traffic enforcement, traffic or
29
road problems, road block, or accidents.”
What the Ohio study reveals is that, first, consistent
with earlier studies, the bulk of a police officer’s workload
does not involve civilian contact or crime-fighting activities.
Police officers spend more than 75 percent of their time in
activities that involve either no contact with citizens or no
crime-related activities. This is, of course, an ancillary
point, but it remains true even in today’s more communityoriented policing models.
But second, and more importantly, the typical police
officer, whether a COP officer or a beat officer, spends more
of her time on proactive patrol-model policing than on more
reactive crime-solving and warrant-type policing. Beat
officers, for instance, spend about 76 minutes per shift (or
16 percent of their shift) on average engaged in Patrol Model
tasks, and 58 minutes or 12 percent of their shift in
Warrant Model activities. Even using these very rough
measures of the warrant versus patrol models, police
officers in this jurisdiction are spending more of their shifts
engaged in the preemptive, preventative tasks of
investigating suspicious behavior and maintaining order.
A second study, conducted by James Frank, Steven
Brandl, and R. Cory Watkins, compared the tasks and
workloads of traditional crime-solving officers (“beat
30
officers”) to neighborhood officers (“COP officers”). The
data were collected using systematic observations between
January and August 1995 in Cincinnati, Ohio as part of a
larger study on the effectiveness of community policing
31
efforts. Over the course of the study, the researchers
examined sixteen community police officers and fourteen
beat officers assigned to the same neighborhoods as the
32
community police officers. Each officer was observed
29

Id. The other activity categories are of little interest to us either
because they exclude civilian contact or because they have
nothing to do with crime. So, for instance, “Foot patrol” and
“Motor patrol,” which are defined as “Proportion of time spent
patrolling on foot” or “in vehicle,” respectively, do not include the
interaction time with civilians; whereas ‘Service,” which is defined
as “Activities providing service or assistance to citizens, for
example assisting motorists, returning lost property, giving
information, providing medical assistance, assisting a citizen
locked out of a building, or giving directions,” is not crime-related.
30
Frank, Brandl, and Watkins, supra note 26, at 718.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 719.
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during two eight-hour shifts: observations of COP officers
occurred during 59 shifts (totaling 432.20 hours), while
observations of beat officers occurred during 20 shifts
33
(totaling 171.48 hours).
The researchers distinguished between crime-related
activities and other kinds of service and administrative
activities. Crime-related activities involved a specific
reported criminal occurrence and included such tasks as
“serving warrants on suspects, making arrests, issuing
citations, conducting investigations involving specific
occurrences, and preparing reports related to specific
criminal incidents.”34 The study revealed that both beat
officers and COP officers spent most of their crime-focused
time conducting vehicle and foot patrol, as compared to the
amount of time actually engaged in effectuating an arrest.
The activity with the greatest frequency was “vehicle patrol,”
which accounted for 22.01 percent of a COP officer’s time
and 32.97 percent of a beat officer’s time. 35 By contrast,
making arrests accounted for only 0.90 percent of a COP
officer’s time and 6.48 percent of a beat officer’s time.36 As
the authors emphasized, “almost one-third (32.97 percent)
of all patrol officer time was spent performing routine
vehicle patrol.” 37
This is even more true in rural, small town, and
suburban police forces, which spend an even greater
proportion of their time engaged in the kind of traffic
enforcement activities that are generally associated with
preemptive policing—and also, tragically, in this country,
with racial profiling. A number of studies have focused on
the smaller police agencies in small towns and rural
places—policing Mayberry as it were—and the findings here
38
converge as well.
In a third study, a recent observational study of the
workload of the suburban police that used very similar
methods and categories—in order, precisely, to be able to
33

Id. at 720.
Id.
35
Id. at 724 (Table II for beat officer); and 721 (Table I for COP officer).
34
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Id.
Id. at 723.

See, e.g., Ralph A. Weisheit, David N. Falcone, and L. Edward Wells, Crime
and Policing in Rural and Small Town America (Waveland Press 1996); John
Liederbach and James Frank, Policing Mayberry: the work routines of smalltown and rural officers, American Journal of Criminal Justice, 28(1): 53-72
(2003); Liederbach, supra note 24.

19

20

Randomization and the Fourth Amendment

compare their findings with the existing studies on urban
forces—the author, John Liederbach, discovered far more
time spent on traffic enforcement. This study, too, relied on
systematic social observation conducted over a 14-month
period between April 1999 and May 2000 and involving
3,537 hours of observation (the equivalent of 442 eight39
hour shifts). The study sites included fourteen different
suburban police agencies in Hamilton County, Ohio, with
very diverse demographic, socio-economic, and land use
variations. Two of the communities were exclusive upper
income, three were middle income residential, two middle
income diversified, one middle income integrated, three
working class residential, and three working class
urbanized. The study utilized the same coding instruments
including both activity and encounter categories.
We can draw four conclusions from this study. First,
suburban police officers spent 83 percent of their time on
40
activities that involved no contact with civilians. Second,
though, and more importantly, traffic enforcement was one
of the five dominant uses of time and, of those five, the only
one involving civilian encounters (the other four top
activities were motorized patrol, administrative tasks
(primarily report writing), personal off-duty tasks, and
41
traveling en route to specific locations). Third, of all citizen
encounter time, traffic enforcement (again) was the most
time consuming, representing 30.1 percent on average of
police-citizen encounters, in contrast, for example, to 19.1
percent for crime-related activities. Traffic problems
“consumed the largest percentage of encounter time” in a
large majority of the suburban agencies, as compared to at
least nine other categories of tasks (including crime-related,
42
investigative, and order-maintenance). Together, traffic
enforcement, investigations, and order-maintenance clearly
outweighed the other civilian contact hours. Fourth, the
amount of time engaged in actually serving warrants was
miniscule. The study coded the number of times that police
officers encountered different types of problem interactions
with civilians, and the tally is revealing:

TYPE OF PROBLEM

39

Liederbach, supra note 24, at 419.
Id. at 423.
41
Id. at 424.
42
Id. at 425.
40

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN
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ENCOUNTERS
Patrol-type encounters:
1. Traffic problems

714

2. Investigative problems

197

3. Order maintenance
problems

159

Subtotal

1,070

Warrant-type encounters
1. Warrant to be served

37

2. Other crime problems

378

Subtotal

415

The author concluded that these findings “show the
predominance of traffic issues for suburban officers in
terms of both the large degree of time that traffic problems
consumed and the frequency with which these officers
43
encountered traffic problems while on shift.” The author
emphasized, “Six of the top problems were traffic related.
Excess speed was the most frequently encountered problem
as a whole, and traffic was the primary problem in 29.7
44
percent of all citizen encounters across the 14 agencies.”
These findings are very similar to the findings in small town
and rural police departments.
In addition to these three often-cited studies, a more
recent 2009 study examining the time allocated to proactive
and reactive activities by traditional and community officers
45
provides further support. This study, by Christine Famega,
focused more directly on the workload difference between
preemptive, proactive policing methods in the mold of the

43

Id. at 427.
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44

21

22

Randomization and the Fourth Amendment

Patrol Model and more reactive, 911-response policing in
46
the mold of the Warrant Model.
Like the three earlier studies, the 2009 study
collected data by means of systematic observation of
47
officers during a two-week period in 1999. Trained
observers accompanied officers during 251 shifts, taking
notes of the officers’ activities during each shift, and
48
recorded 180 types of officer conduct. These observed
activities were then classified as either proactive (defined as
any “activity initiated by the officer, initiated in response to
a citizen at the scene, or based on information of
instructions provided by the police”) or reactive (defined as
any “activity conducted in response to a 911, 311, or
49
district dispatch”).
Consistent with earlier studies, the research found
that the greatest proportion of officers’ proactive time was
consumed by patrol activities (34.76 percent for beat
officers and approximately 30 percent for communityoriented officers). The evidence clearly demonstrated that
proactive policing far outweighs reactive policing: beat
officers “spend approximately 21% of their time engaged in
reactive activities, 50% of their time engaged in proactive
activities, and 29% of their time engaged in other
50
activities.”
Although none of the studies map on perfectly to the
Patrol versus Warrant Models and are, in this sense, only
rough proxies for our distinction, each one of them
corroborates the central insight that policing today involves
far more group-based preemptive suspicion than warrantlike encounters focused on a particular individual.
Christine Famega’s study may come closest and its
conclusion serves well here: “Overall, 50% of [beat] officer
time is spent engaged in proactive activities, as compared to
29% of time engaged in administrative and personal
activities (other activities), and 21% of time is spent on
reactive activities. Clearly, [beat] officers have a good deal of

46

The author’s own description is instructive. She notes that the point of the
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time for proactive work, though most of it is spent on
51
patrol.”
B. Modeling Suspicion and Police Practices
The empirical evidence and workload research
suggest a couple of ways of visualizing our main point. The
first works in one dimension, along a spectrum delineated
by the two opposed ideal types of police-civilian
encounters—the Warrant and the Patrol Models. At one end
of the spectrum lies the warrant-type of encounter: for
instance, the situation where the police have unique
identifying information concerning a specific individual,
such as the spouse batterer who has committed the act in
front of the police or the individual bearing Roman
Polanski’s passport. This type of encounter is what we have
characterized fitting into a “Warrant Model” of policing. At
the other extreme lies a more speculative group-based
identification of a person for an encounter: for instance, a
situation involving an apparent truant with a bulge in his
pocket; or someone who fits the description of the
perpetrator of a recent armed robbery; or an individual who
seems to be casing a car or a store. These types of
situations, when they give rise to an investigative stop or
search, are what we have characterized as fitting into a
“Patrol Model” of policing.
The police research suggests that most police-civilian
encounters are arrayed along this spectrum ranging from
warrant to patrol models of policing. Not entirely
coincidentally, the spectrum also coincides with the range
of probabilities of suspicion. The warrant-type encounters
are stacked on the side of higher probabilities of suspicion,
while the patrol-type encounters are arrayed toward the
lower end of the probabilities scale. We believe, and
research demonstrates, that most police work loads onto
the Patrol Model end of the spectrum as opposed to the the
Warrant Model end, which is also to say that most of the
time when police officer engage people, they are operating
on the basis of a probability of suspicion that is far smaller
than 1. This is illustrated in the following figure:

51
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Graph: Single Dimension along Model and Probability Scale

Patrol Model of Policing

Warrant Model of Policing

BULK OF POLICING
P = 0.35
Probability = 1

Probability = 0

Batterer arrest;
Polanski arrest
Terry stop

Amount of suspicion necessary to
satisfy “reasonable suspicion” under
the Fourth Amendment

As this figure suggests, there are, on the right hand
side, a limited number of police encounters that come close
to the execution of an arrest warrant for a fugitive or for an
accused who committed his crime on videotape. These are
the extreme cases where the level of suspicion is close to 1
on a probability scale and where the proper model to
evaluate reasonable suspicion may as well be binary. The
suspect is “the one” in most of these warrant model cases.
Reconsider our previous example of a police officer who
witnesses a known batterer beat his wife. Again, the
suspect here is almost surely the right person. To the left of
that small set of cases, though, is the vast majority of
policing encounters. These cases are far more speculative
and the probability that the suspect is in fact guilty of a
crime ranges widely. Individuals may be suspected because
they fit a description (young black male near the scene of
the robbery), or fit a suspect behavior (glancing furtively
while “casing” an establishment), or demonstrate a suspect
trait (wearing a heavy overcoat in the summer heat or
displaying a bulge in his pants pocket). The probability of
the suspicion varies in all of these cases based on the
group-based nature of the suspicious trait or behavior.
There is no “on” or “off” of individual suspicion here; rather,
there are just levels of suspicion that may or may not meet
constitutional muster. Somewhere along that spectrum, the
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Supreme Court must draw the line of reasonableness.
Another way to visualize our point works in two
dimensions. The first dimension (x-axis) has to do with
whether the police have identified a particular individual or
whether the police are engaged in purely preventative
policing. The second dimension (y-axis) has to do with
whether there is a crime that has occurred and needs to be
solved or whether the police are merely policing to prevent
crimes from happening. The two dimensions give rise,
essentially, to a two-by-two graph where the Patrol Model
cases (red) can be distinguished from the Warrant Model
incidents (yellow):

In the upper left quadrant, the prototypical case is
that of an identified individual who has been accused of an
identifiable crime—say, the battering husband or Roman
Polanksi. These cases fit the Warrant Model. The upper
right hand quadrant contains cases, like the famous case of
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Brown v City of Oneonta,52 where a crime has been
committed and all the police have is an eyewitness lead
based on some general demographic traits. The witness
identification there leads to the interrogation and hand
search of all young African-Americans in the town. This
qualifies as the Patrol Model. In the lower left quadrant
there are odd-ball cases of identified persons whose crime
has not yet been identified perfectly—for instance, Al
Capone. These few cases would be characterized as
warrant-type investigations. In the bottom right quadrant,
well, that is the bulk of policing: cases of ordinary street
stops.
It should be clear by now that the vast majority of
police work covers the bottom right part of the graph. In
that quadrant (and in the adjoining area above), suspicion
is probabilistic, and its reasonableness bears little
relationship to a model that targets a particular individual.
In these cases we do not really care that suspicion attaches
to an individual qua individual, rather than to the
individual as a member of a group. What we care about is
the level of suspicion that attaches to the group of
individuals who are identified as sharing whatever
combination of traits, conditions and behaviors are
identified and how reliably that level of suspicion can be
demonstrated. The police do not need individualized
suspicion in these cases. What they need is the right
quantum of probabilistic suspicion for the group. Once one
accepts this point, it should be clear that adding the word
“individualized” to suspicion is not helpful to answering the
central question in these Fourth Amendment cases:
whether the police activity is “reasonable.”
In truth, the only way to make semantic sense of the
term “individualized suspicion” in the vast majority of cases
that lie in the lower right quadrant of the table would be to
require that the intersection of suspicious group-based
traits, conditions, and behaviors identify a unique
individual. Obviously, that requirement would represent a
degree of certainty of suspicion that is exponentially greater
than the level of suspicion that courts conventionally attach
to the term “individualized suspicion” in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Such a requirement would defy
common sense, and most people would likely find it
intolerable.

52 221 F3d 329 (2d Cir 2000).
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We don’t think it is necessary or desirable to reduce
the quantum of suspicion necessary to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment in order to pursue the goal of randomization.
Our goal instead is to propose a constitutional framework
that allows courts to better define and track the level of
suspicion police officers and agencies need in order to
satisfy constitutional mandates. By paying attention to the
level of suspicion in searches and seizures, rather than the
individualization of suspicion, courts will be in a better
position to give meaning to the notion of reasonableness.

III. Rethinking Fourth Amendment Principles
The Supreme Court has debated the pros and cons of
randomized search programs in a number of discrete
Fourth Amendment contexts—such as border patrol
roadblocks and administrative and public school drug53
testing programs. In all these situations, the Court has
considered the propriety of extending the requirement of
“individualized suspicion” outside the nucleus of police and
crime-related searches and seizures. It is important to
emphasize at the outset, though, that in all of those other
areas the notion of “individualized suspicion” is opposed to
suspicionless searches and seizures. The debate is not
between “individualized suspicion” versus a probabilistic
notion of suspicion like ours. The debate is always cast in
terms of a choice between “individualized suspicion” on the
one hand and no suspicion at all on the other.
The Court has repeatedly made clear that the
exceptional categories of searches that are exempt from the
“individualized suspicion” requirement fall under the rubric
54
of “suspicionless searches and seizures.” As Justice Scalia
emphasized in the public school drug testing context, “We
have upheld suspicionless searches and seizures to conduct
drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train
accidents; to conduct random drug testing of federal
customs officers who carry arms or are involved in drug

53

See generally, e.g., Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002);
Vernonia School Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
54
See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653-54 (Scalia, J.); id. at 667-68 (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“For most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless
searches have been generally considered per se unreasonable within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.”) (emphasis added).
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interdiction; and to maintain automobile checkpoints
55
looking for illegal immigrants and contraband.”
In that debate—the debate between suspicion-full
and suspicionless searches and seizures—we fall on the
side of requiring suspicion, especially in the policing
56
context. We believe that reasonable searches and seizures
in the policing context require a certain level of suspicion.
What we argue, though, is that it is precisely the level of
suspicion that should be the focus of the reasonableness
inquiry—along with the evenhandedness of the searches.
Search programs that reveal levels of suspicion that fall
below constitutional minimums are inappropriate in the
criminal justice context; what reasonableness and privacy
require are a certain acceptable quantum of suspicion. In
this sense, we do not espouse suspicionless mass searches,
but rather randomized programs that meet target levels of
suspicion. We acknowledge that the level of suspicion may
need to be determined ex post in certain cases and, as a
result would need to go hand-in-hand with a compensation
mechanism for those randomized programs that do not
meet the minimum level of suspicion. We address this later.
A. Suspicionless Search Programs
The Court has addressed the question of
suspicionless search programs in a number of different
situations. As a doctrinal matter, the framing of the
question is identical in all of the “exceptional cases” where
suspicionless
searches
are
or
are
not
deemed
constitutional. As the Supreme Court made clear in a
number of early cases, the Fourth Amendment’s Warrant
Clause is not applicable to all searches and seizures,
especially not to those that are conducted on the street in a
57
volatile or fluid context. The Warrant Clause does not
58
apply to searches of cars, since they might move, or to

55

See id. at 653-54 (emphasis added).
We are only interested in the policing context and, for that reason, do not
really engage the question of the propriety of suspicionless searches in
administrative or other non-criminal contexts. We lean in favor of requiring
suspicion there too, though the level of suspicion could be set lower and
established after the fact; but we have no deep stake in taking a position outside
the criminal justice context.
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See generally Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Payton v. New
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suspects on the street during unanticipated encounters.
As such, the probable cause requirement specified in the
Warrant Clause also does not attach. The Court has,
however, imposed the same requirement of probable
cause—and subsequently, in certain situations, of
articulable suspicion—as the standard to evaluate
reasonableness under the more general “reasonableness”
subclause of the Fourth Amendment. It is the probable
cause standard that has evolved, over time, into the
requirement that there be “individualized suspicion.” All
this is standard fare.
59

In a line of Fourth Amendment cases, however, the
Supreme Court has drawn exceptions to the “individualized
suspicion” requirement. These exceptional situations have
traditionally lain outside the conventional crime and
policing contexts and have been justified on the grounds of
necessity or efficacy. As Justice O’Connor explained,
dissenting in Vernonia School District v. Acton, the public
school drug-testing case, “[W]e have allowed exceptions in
recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion60
based regime would be ineffectual.” As a result, as the
Court declared in one of the first such cases, Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives’ Association, involving a drug
testing scheme for railroad engineers involved in a train
accident, “In limited circumstances, where the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where
an important governmental interest furthered by the
intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of
individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable
61
despite the absence of such suspicion.” These cases, in
fact, have spawned a constitutional maxim of their own:
“the
Fourth
Amendment
imposes
no
irreducible
62
requirement of such [individualized] suspicion.”
The Court has articulated a number of exceptions to
suspicion-based search regimes in discrete areas such as
randomized
drug-testing
in
public
schools
and
59

See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 423-24 (1976) (“[T]he
judgment of the Nation and Congress has for so long been to authorize
warrantless public arrests on probable cause rather than to encumber criminal
prosecutions with endless litigation.”).
60
515 U.S. at 667-68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
62
The famous passage is originally from United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 560-61 (1976), and has been repeated in myriad subsequent cases,
including Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 643; New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
n.8 (1985); Board of Education v. Earls 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002); Samson v.
California, 547 U.S.843, 855 n.4 (2006).
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suspicionless roadblocks at or near the border. These are
the cases that have given rise to what the Court refers to as
“the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
63
suspicionless searches.”
(1) Drug-Testing in Public Schools
The first line of cases—Vernonia School District v.
Action,64 and Board of Education v. Earls65—involve
suspicionless drug testing in public schools. In Vernonia,
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, held that random drug
testing of student athletes did not violate the Fourth
66
Amendment. During the 1980s, drug use in Vernonia
schools had increased sharply, or so the majority found,
and athletes were perceived as the “leaders of the drug
67
culture.” After exploring a variety of alternatives, the
school district implemented a policy directing school
officials to randomly choose 10 percent of student athletes
to drug test each week. If a student tested positive then
that student had to participate in a 6-week assistance
program or suffer suspension from athletics for the
remainder of the current season and the subsequent
68
season.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
considered a three-factor test to ascertain whether
“individualized suspicion” was necessary—looking first at
the nature of the privacy interest at stake, second at the
nature of the privacy invasion, and third at the nature and
69
Because
immediacy of the governmental concern.
legitimate privacy expectations are attenuated in a school
setting (and to an even greater degree in student athletic
settings), because the results of the test were disclosed to
others only on a “need-to-know” basis, and because the
state has a strong interest in deterring drug use amongst
schoolchildren, Justice Scalia concluded that random drug70
testing did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
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Earls, 536 U.S. at 854 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Chandler v. Miller,
520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
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515 U.S. 646 (1995).
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Seven years later, in Board of Education v. Earls, the
Court expanded its decision in Vernonia to hold that
mandatory drug testing for all students who participated in
extracurricular activities was constitutional.71 The Court
rejected the Tenth Circuit’s holding that a school must be
able to identify drug abuse among a sufficient number of
students and demonstrate that the testing will actually
capture those groups of students. Applying Vernonia’s “factspecific balancing inquiry,” Justice Thomas, writing for the
Court, found that students participating in extracurricular
activities had only a limited expectation of privacy and that
the intrusion on their privacy was minor because the
information was distributed on a need-to-know basis and
72
no authorities would be notified. The Court also found that
the nature and immediacy of protecting schoolchildren’s
health—even absent a factual showing of a serious drug
problem—was
a
sufficiently
important
government
73
interest.
The public school drug testing cases gave rise to a
sharp debate between, on the one hand, Justices Scalia
and Thomas, and, on the other hand, Justices O’Connor
and Ginsburg. All sides made significant use of history—the
first by its absence, the second by its presence. Justice
Scalia’s historical search for “clear practices” at the time of
adoption left little room for reasoning by analogy. Because
public schools did not exist at the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted and the drug problem (and
related technology) is of more recent vintage, Justice Scalia
found that no sufficiently analogous searches existed and
therefore relied on the plain meaning of the text. “As the
text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is
‘reasonableness.’”74 And, where there was no clear practice
either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue
at the time the constitutional provision was enacted,
whether a particular search meets the reasonableness
standard “is judged by balancing its intrusion on the
individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interest.”75

71
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Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, relied on the
Court’s historical treatment of the Fourth Amendment.
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not
explicitly require individualized suspicion, Justice O’Connor
argued in dissent that “[f]or most of our constitutional
history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally
considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”76 Justice O’Connor rested strongly on
Carroll v. United States, in which the Court stated in 1925
that “[i]t would be intolerable and unreasonable if a
prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile
on the chance of finding liquor and thus subject all persons
lawfully using the highways to the indignity of such a
search.”77 Justice O’Connor used several historical studies
to bolster her claim that the framers believed that blanket
searches were “intolerable and unreasonable,” and intended
to codify that conviction into the Fourth Amendment.78
The fact is, however, that the debate is narrowly
circumscribed, rests on common legal ground, and is
limited to a disagreement over the effectiveness of
suspicion-based search programs. Both sides agree that
“individualized suspicion” is not required in all contexts
and that the effectiveness of a search program is key to the
determination. They disagree, however, as to the
effectiveness of suspicion-based searches in the public
school context. Thus, Justice O’Connor wrote: “we have
allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been
clear that a suspicion based regime would be ineffectual.”79
In a surprisingly similar passage, Justice Scalia argued that
because the Fourth Amendment has “no irreducible
requirement of suspicion,”80 in situations where it would be
“impracticable” due to “special needs” to determine
individualized suspicion, a search will not violate the
Fourth Amendment.81 Both sides agree that there ought to
76
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be a preference for suspicion, but the crux of their
disagreement is over the technical effectiveness of the
search programs.
(2) Border Patrol Roadblocks
In another line of cases culminating in United States
82
v. Martinez-Fuerte, the Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of fixed immigration checkpoints and there
too held that suspicionless searches passed constitutional
muster—more specifically, that Border Patrol agents require
no articulable suspicion to stop and question motorists at a
83
roadblock within 100 miles of the Mexican border.
The Martinez-Fuerte case arose from arrests made at
two different permanent immigration checkpoints within
100 miles of the Mexican border: one in California, the
other in Texas. Both checkpoints were marked in the
traditional fashion with large black-on-yellow signs and
flashing lights, and subsequent warning signs as motorists
got closer. At the first checkpoint in San Clemente,
California, the point agent visually screened all northbound
traffic, but did not conduct questioning there. Instead the
agent would select a number of motorists for further
investigation at a secondary inspection site, where other
agents would stop and question the motorists about their
citizenship and immigration status. At the time of the
arrests at the San Clemente checkpoint, a magistrate had
issued a “warrant of inspection” which authorized the
84
Border Patrol to conduct roadblock operations at the site.
At the Sarita, Texas, checkpoint, Border Patrol officers
would stop all northbound traffic for brief questioning, with
the exception of local residents who the officers recognized.
In contrast to the San Clemente checkpoint, there was no
85
judicial warrant regarding the operations at Sarita.
In a 7-to-2 decision, the Supreme Court held that
neither articulable suspicion nor a judicial warrant was
necessary as a precondition for a search at an immigration
86
roadblock within one hundred miles of the border. In other
words, no suspicion was required. Justice Powell wrote the
opinion for the court and began by considering the balance
of interests. Permanent checkpoints, the government had
82

428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. at 566-67.
84
Id. at 545-47.
85
Id. at 549-50.
86
Id. at 566-67.
83

33

34

Randomization and the Fourth Amendment

maintained before the Court, were “the most important of
the traffic-checking operations.”87 They were also highly
effective, Justice Powell suggested. The San Clemente
checkpoint, for instance, resulted in the apprehension of
17,000 illegal aliens in 1973 from about 10 million cars
88
that passed through the checkpoint. Their effectiveness,
Powell intimated, would be greatly diminished if stops had
to be based on reasonable suspicion: such a requirement
“would be impractical because the flow of traffic tends to be
too heavy to allow the particularized study of a given car
that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of
illegal aliens. In particular, such a requirement would
largely eliminate any deterrent to the conduct of welldisguised smuggling operations, even though smugglers are
known to use these highways regularly.”89
By contrast, the intrusion on liberty was relatively
minor—in Justice Powell’s words, “quite limited.”90 All that
was required was a “brief detention of travelers,” “a
response to a brief question or two,” and “possibly the
production of a document evidencing a right to be in the
United States.”91 Justice Powell emphasized that the
subjective intrusion was “appreciably less in the case of a
checkpoint stop.”92 These stops involve less discretion on
the part of the agents, less interference with legitimate
traffic, and less potential for abuse. Even the secondary
stops at the San Clemente checkpoint, Justice Powell
argued, were relatively minor. Those referrals were “made
for the sole purpose of conducting a routine and limited
inquiry into residence status” and involved an “objective
intrusion” that “remains minimal,” Justice Powell
93
suggested. “Selective referral may involve some annoyance,
but it remains true that the stops should not be frightening
or offensive because of their public and relatively routine
nature.”94 As a result, and because of the more limited
expectation of privacy in cars as opposed to homes, Justice
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Powell concluded that no individualized suspicion at all was
needed “at reasonably located checkpoints.”95
Justice Brennan wrote a heated dissent, in which
Justice Marshall joined. Justice Brennan described the
result as the “defacement of Fourth Amendment
protections,”96 declaring that “[t]oday’s decision is the ninth
this Term marking the continuing evisceration of Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”97 What Brennan objected to most was the lack of
any objective standard to evaluate the reasonableness of
the stop. Whereas in previous cases—Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, United States v. Ortiz, and United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce—the Court had required some modicum of
98
here the Court had abandoned the
reasonableness,
reasonableness standard completely. “We are told today
. . . that motorists without number may be individually
stopped, questioned, visually inspected, and then further
detained without even a showing of articulable suspicion,
let alone the heretofore constitutional minimum of
reasonable suspicion, a result that permits search and
seizure to rest upon ‘nothing more substantial than
inarticulate hunches.’”99
On our view, naturally, there was a level of suspicion
at the roadblocks and the only important question would
have been whether the hit rates at those checkpoints
satisfied the minimum threshold to be established by the
Court.
(3) Other Contexts
In addition, the Court has upheld a number of
suspicionless search programs outside the criminal context,
100
including inspections of commercial establishments and
101
searches in correctional facilities. There are other cases,
however, where, drawing on the very same logic and
rationale, the Court has struck down suspicionless search
programs. An example is Chandler v. Miller, where the
Court reviewed the state of Georgia’s legal requirement that
95
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The
any candidate for state office pass a drug test.
Chandler Court held that the drug-testing program did not
respond to a “concrete danger,” that there was no evidence
of a particular drug problem, and that state office holders
were not engaged in tasks that carried high risks or safety
103
hazards for third parties. In other words, there was no
special need or compelling state interest and no good
reason to infringe on privacy interests.
102

The upshot of this line of cases is that suspicionless
searches ought to be strictly curtailed to all but the most
“exigent” circumstances, “after balancing the invasion of
privacy against the government’s strong need.”104 The
Court’s construction of the Fourth Amendment is that
“individualized suspicion” should reign in the core criminal
contexts of traditional policing, but that exceptions can be
made outside that core context where the requirement of
suspicion would render the program ineffectual and where
there is both an important state interest and a limited
infringement of privacy.
But in all of these cases, the debate has been about
suspicion-based versus suspicionless searches—and in that
105
sense, they are all orthogonal to our argument. We are not
arguing for suspicionless searches. To the contrary, we are
demanding that a level of suspicion be established as a
precondition to the constitutionality of the search. We are
setting the level of suspicion as the baseline. If anything, we
are demanding more than the Court does in the traditional
crime-related policing context. We are asking that the
actual level of suspicion be articulated on a probability
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There is, however, something very interesting about Vernonia. It turns out,
actually, that there may have been a suspicion basis to the random drug testing
program. The evidence of drug use from the school suggested—not only to the
school authorities, but also to Justice Scalia—that the athlete students had a
higher probability of using drugs; that the student athletes were, as a group, in a
class of more-likely drug abusers. As the lower court found, and Justice Scalia
noted, “athletes were the leaders of the drug culture.” Id. at 649. And it was this
group that was singled out for random searches; as Justice Scalia emphasized,
“The Policy applies to all students participating in interscholastic athletics.” Id.
at 651. So, even though the Court and the parties considered the program
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underlying the targeting of the school athletes. Depending on the level of
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scale and that all search programs be evaluated against
that chosen level.
Our challenge, then, is not to “individualized
suspicion” as opposed to suspicionless searches. We are all
for suspicion. Our trouble, instead, is with the idea of
“individualized suspicion,” which, we believe, is a misguided
add-on to the notion of suspicion.
B. The Term “Individualized Suspicion” Is Misguided
The term “individualized suspicion” is an empty
concept that functions as a mere substitute for the term
“constitutional.” This is evident in a case such as
Indianapolis v. Edmond, where the Seventh Circuit and later
the Supreme Court were called upon to decide the
constitutionality of police roadblocks intended to detect
106
drug contraband. A little background about the case first.
On six occasions between August and November
1998, the Indianapolis police department set up roadblocks
on certain city streets to catch drug offenders. The locations
of these roadblocks were determined weeks in advance
based on information regarding area crime statistics and
traffic flow. The roadblocks were conducted during the
daytime and were identified with signs that read:
“NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT __ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS
K-9 IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP.”107 At each site,
approximately thirty police officers were present, and they
would stop a predetermined number of vehicles. A group of
vehicles would be diverted to the search area, and the other
traffic would then be allowed to go through until the police
had finished processing the group of stopped vehicles.108 As a
result, the searches were randomized at the checkpoint.
During each stop, a police officer would approach the
driver and request his or her driver’s license and car
registration. The stopped cars and their passengers would
then be subject to a plain view search of the interior
through the car windows, and a dog-sniffing search of the
exterior of the automobiles. According to the police, the
entire process was designed not to exceed five minutes.109
Over the course of the six roadblocks, 1,161 vehicles were
stopped. The stops produced fifty-five drug-related arrests
106
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and forty-nine non-drug related arrests (for offenses such
as driving with an expired driver’s license), resulting in a
4.74 percent drug-arrest hit rate and an overall hit rate of
8.96 percent.110
The roadblocks, it seemed, had everything going for
them: they distributed the costs of enforcement evenly
across motorists, interfered as minimally as possible with
the motorists’ movement, invaded only slightly motorists’
privacy interests, and, according to everyone on the
Seventh Circuit panel at least, produced very “high” rates of
111
They
were
also
randomly
successful
searches.
administered, which means that police officers could not
individually
discriminate
against
African-American
112
drivers—or at least, less easily. Despite this, Judge Posner
reversed the lower federal court—which had not enjoined
the police practice—and put a stop to the roadblocks,
resting the decision on the arguable notion that the police
did not have any “individualized suspicion” to stop and
113
Judge Posner, like most
question any motorist.
commentators, sought “individualized suspicion” and found
none. Posner wrote, “here the roadblock is meant to
intercept a completely random sample of drivers; there is
neither probable cause nor articulable suspicion to stop
114
any given driver.”
With respect to both statements, Judge Posner was
formally correct. It is critical to see, however, that in the
context of the checkpoint the second statement regarding
probable cause and articulable suspicion was, in truth,
inaccurate: for each driver, there was a 4.74 percent chance
that he was carrying drugs. We know this after the fact, but
we know it nonetheless. For each and every one of those
automobile travelers, there was “individualized suspicion”
of 4.74 percent. That is a very specific and articulable level
of suspicion. Whether it is reasonable suspicion depends
entirely on whether that level—4.74 percent—satisfies the
quantum required by the Fourth Amendment. But that
inquiry does not depend on whether the suspicion is
“individualized” or not. It does depend on whether Judge
Posner (or courts generally) thinks that 4.74 percent is a
high enough probability that crime is “afoot” to justify
110

Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F3d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id at 662.
112
Id at 663.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 663.
111

Randomization and the Fourth Amendment

interfering
interests
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privacy

In truth, then, there was a level of suspicion that
attached to all drivers. This notion of a quantum of
suspicion is no different than in the classic case of witness
identification. So, for instance, if a victim testifies that the
perpetrator was a University of Chicago graduate student
who wore Converse high-tops, and there are, say, 500
graduate students at the University of Chicago who wore
Converse high-tops out of a student body of 10,000, then
we can easily conclude that our “individualized suspicion”
to question U of C grad students who wore Converse hightops reaches 5 percent. We can quantify and establish
before questioning the exact level of “individualized
suspicion” that we require and determine whether it meets
some minimum threshold to justify detaining and
questioning any of those graduate students.
The only difference between these two cases is a
temporal one: we do not know the level of individualized
suspicion in the roadblock case until after we have begun
to conduct stops and visual and canine searches at the
roadblocks. (Though here, since this involves a random
sample of motorists, we can be pretty confident that we
would have similar levels of suspicion at similarly selected
sites in the near future. We could also obtain this
information through research or surveys.) In the second
case, we know ex ante from the witness identification and
other information the level of suspicion and can use that to
assess whether there is sufficient justification to stop and
question individuals. In both cases, though, we can pretty
easily determine the level of suspicion—the actual level of
so-called “individualized suspicion.”
In other words, there was “individualized suspicion”
in Edmond. Judge Posner could have found “individualized
suspicion” at the level of 4.74 percent. What he meant to
say, of course, is that there was not enough suspicion, but
here too he could easily have found that there was. The
courts have never established a percentage requirement for
individualized suspicion or probable cause, and as Chief
Judge Easterbrook noted in dissent, individualized
115
suspicion has been found at far less than 4.74 percent.
Again, what matters is the quantum of suspicion.
Was there enough in Edmond? That would be the only
proper question to ask in order to assess reasonableness of
115
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the searches. The answer, though, is not so clear. These hit
rates were perceived by the Seventh Circuit as successful in
detecting illicit drug and other criminal violations. Judge
Posner repeatedly referred to these hit rates as “high” and
added that they are “vastly higher than, for example, the
probability of a hit as a result of the screening of embarking
passengers and their luggage at airports.”116 Judge
Easterbrook, in dissent, similarly referred to the program in
glowing terms: “The program is spectacularly successful as
roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are arrested, with the
reason equally divided between driving and drug crimes.”117
Citing the Martinez-Fuerte Border Patrol case and the
118
sobriety
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz
checkpoint case—cases which involved hit rates of 0.12 and
1.6
percent
respectively—Easterbrook
noted
that
“[r]oadblocks with much lower rates of success have been
held consistent with the fourth amendment.”119
As a purely factual matter, though, the 4.74 percent
drug hit rate—or, for that matter, the 8.96 percent overall
hit rate including minor traffic violations120—is not really
“spectacular,” as Easterbrook suggested.121 Hit rates from
other law enforcement interventions have been far greater.
For example, the Maryland state patrol between January
1995 and January 1999 achieved drug contraband hit rates
along Maryland’s I-95 corridor of 32 percent with regard to
white drivers and 34 percent with regard to AfricanAmerican drivers.122 In Missouri for the year 2001, police
traffic stops achieved drug hit rates—that is drugs only, not
including faulty drivers’ licenses—of 19.7, 12.3, and 9.8
percent respectively for whites, African-Americans, and

116
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Hispanics.123 A 1982 Department of Justice study of airport
searches using a drug-courier profile reported forty-nine
successful searches based on ninety-six total searches, for
a hit rate of 51.04 percent.124 A government report analyzing
New York City stop-and-frisks, prepared in 1999, revealed
average hit rates (stop-to-arrest) of approximately 13.7
percent in situations found to present reasonable
suspicion.125 In the abstract, devoid of any comparative
evidence about search success rates in other contexts, the
4.74 percent drug hit rate may well seem “high” or even
“spectacularly successful”; however, that may be an artifact
of judicial decisionmaking with no data, a perennial
problem in constitutional criminal procedure.126
Ultimately, courts should have to decide whether a
4.74 percent probability of success is sufficient to satisfy
the Constitution. But the decision turns on the quantum of
evidence, not on whether it is “individualized” or not. If
anything, the “individualized suspicion” construct prevents
courts from conducting the right inquiry.
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted, and
as the plain text of the Constitution suggests, “the ultimate
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is
127
‘reasonableness.’” Our argument in no way casts doubt on
that principle. It relies on it heavily. Our point is that the
reasonableness of a governmental search does not turn on
“individualized suspicion” but on whether it meets a certain
level of suspicion.
C. The Birth of “Individualized Suspicion”
The term “individualized suspicion” has become
today a place holder for the conclusion that a search is
“reasonable”—or for that matter, that there is “probable
cause” or “articulable suspicion.” When courts find (or do
not find) “individualized suspicion,” they are in fact merely
using a substitute term for the idea of probable cause, a
term which itself was never properly defined. The evidence
123
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surrounding the usage of the term
suspicion” is entirely consistent with this.

“individualized

The term “individualized suspicion” dates from the
mid-1970s and has mushroomed over the past few decades
in both federal and state courts. One of the earliest uses of
the term was, in fact, in the Martinez-Fuerte decision in
128
1976. The term actually emerged hand-in-hand with two
others—“particularized suspicion” and “unparticularized
suspicion”—the latter term appearing first in Terry v.
129
Ohio. It is impressive to look at the historical use of all
three sets of terms.
As noted, the first, “individualized suspicion,”
originates in the 1970s. The following graphs reflect the
usage of the term in judicial decisions. The data were
obtained using the LEXIS database. The first graph reflects
usage of the term “individualized suspicion” in federal court
cases, the second in state court cases:
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Notice that there is a slight lag from the federal cases
to the state cases, which reflects, naturally, that the term
originated with the federal appellate courts. The following
graph is the combined state and federal cases using the
term “individualized suspicion,” and it reflects a relatively
consistent upward trend, with 162 uses of the term both in
2006 and 2007:
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These graphs suggest that the term “individualized
suspicion” emerged in the 1970s and caught on, somewhat
contagiously. The pattern is entirely consistent with the
idea that this new term took off as a way to render more
concrete a notion of reasonable or articulable suspicion
that—just like probable cause—was never specifically
defined in probabilistic terms. The term “individualized
suspicion” was intended to carry some substantive
meaning, but it did not and does not today. It has become a
rhetorical trope used to satisfy a standard that remains
today undefined.
Interestingly, this is true as well of the term
“particularized suspicion.” The data on usage reveals a
similar pattern. The first graph, again, traces the usage of
the term in federal cases; the second, in state cases:
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Again, the combined data for federal and state uses
of the term show a relatively consistent increase, with a
slight dip in the final year of the data (2007), but no
indication of a significant shift in usage.

The other interesting trend, then, is the use of the
term “unparticularized suspicion” or “non-particularized
suspicion,” which is the term that appeared first in Terry. If
one searches the LEXIS database for those two terms
(“unparticularized” and “non-particularized”) from Terry to
the present, there are over 2,000 uses of the terms. Again,
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the first two graphs are the federal and state usages, and
the third graph contains the combined data:
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Here too, the trend is consistently upward and
mirrors the usage patterns for the (inverse) terms of
“individualized suspicion” and “particularized suspicion.”
The bottom line is that these patterns are entirely
consistent with our argument that the expression
“individualized suspicion” has come to serve as a substitute
for probable cause or articulable suspicion, terms that in
truth were never properly defined by the Court.

IV. An Alternative Construct: Randomization
Our argument so far is that the term “individualized
suspicion” is largely empty, and the courts have not used it
to provide police with anything close to concrete guidance
in assessing their practices. It is, instead, a rhetorical
placeholder used to bless police practices without providing
policing agencies with any guidance or requirements for
structuring decisionmaking in a way that limits and shapes
discretion. If offers simply no direction to policing and other
law enforcement agencies to develop practices that
appropriately constrain discretion.
A. The Checkpoint as Loadstar
In this Part, we suggest a construct that does: the
checkpoint. Checkpoints, or roadblocks, look very different
from the world of policing envisioned by the individualized
suspicion paradigm. The individualized suspicion paradigm
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imagines an officer, possibly roving, on the street making
judgments about the suspicious nature of the activities,
apparel, and appearance of individuals in a particular
geographic area in light of that officer’s training and
experience. When the officer stops or arrests someone, the
Fourth Amendment question is whether the officer can tell
a story that is sufficiently compelling to the decisionmaker
so that he or she will conclude that there was
“individualized suspicion” for the police action. The
checkpoint paradigm is entirely different: on this model,
there is a fixed roadblock established on the basis of a prior
plan that has been approved by those who supervise the
officers who will actually be conducting the searches. The
reason for establishing the checkpoint already has been
approved by superiors in advance. Critically, checkpoints
would be constitutional only when every car is stopped
unless a randomized stopping plan is adopted, as was the
case in Edmond, and the resulting hit rate meets a certain
level of suspicion.
These last points, we contend, are the most
important differences between the two models. Stops based
on “individualized suspicion” attempt justification through
the establishment of good reasons for interference, while
checkpoint stops are justified primarily because there are
no reasons for such actions beyond the justification for the
checkpoint itself. Once the base level of suspicion has been
satisfied, the stops are no longer justified by subjective
beliefs, hunches, and prejudices about greater suspicion,
but rather on the basis of evenhandedness.
Although this may, at first glance, seem to disregard
constitutional norms, it is precisely what promotes the core
constitutional values in the Fourth Amendment context.
Take a moment to consider a key danger of the
individualized suspicion regime, namely the cost of being
incorrectly targeted for police intervention. In a world in
which the police must have good reasons for interfering
with a person’s autonomy, the stakes of incorrect decisions
are far higher. In the current constitutional regime, what
makes a decision by a police officer a good one is whether
we believe that officer has correctly (or correctly enough)
identified or targeted a potential offender. As Sherry Colb
elegantly explains, this targeting harm is a cost to
individuals, in addition to the distinct costs of autonomy
130
When police get it
invasion and of privacy curtailment.
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right, we do not care very much about the targeting costs.
But when they get it wrong, those costs become a great
concern in terms not only of the costs to the individual but
also to the legitimacy of the criminal justice system. And
the fact is, the police stop and arrest many, many more
people than are ultimately charged or convicted of crimes.
In contrast to “individual suspicion” stops, random
checkpoint stops are not justified with reference to good
reason, but because of randomization. Police are not
required to have a good reason to stop a person at a
checkpoint once there is a justification for that checkpoint
procedure. It is enough that the person stopped is the third
or fifth or thirteenth in line—or that the person is in the cue
if every car is stopped. Importantly, while there may be no
good reason for any particular car to be stopped, it should
be clear that there is a complete absence of bad reasons.
This is so because a randomization program effectively
strips officers from exercising any discretion to stop
individual cars. Indeed, if an officer does exercise
discretion, then that officer’s actions would make the
checkpoint unconstitutional. And note that since we can be
confident that police officers operating a checkpoint cannot
exercise their discretion to make bad decisions, there is no
targeting harm from a checkpoint-based stop for any
individual.
The effect on the targeted population is likely to be
immense. To see this, consider two different types of search
paradigms, the Michigan v. Sitz checkpoint on the one
131
“individualized
hand, and the Whren v. United States
suspicion” model on the other. If one were to draw a
distributional curve of the different groups of people who
are stopped at a typical checkpoint in an “average”
neighborhood, it would look like this.
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In the typical checkpoint, the median person stopped
is likely to be the median population member. Also, note
that the bulk of people stopped are likely to cluster around
the median. By contrast, if one were to draw a
distributional curve of the group of people stopped under
the regime approved in Whren, it would look like this.

Number of People Searched
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Here the tail on the left side of the curve reflects that
the median person stopped is poorer, Black and less
educated than his counterpart on the Sitz curve.
As a result, the two regimes impose potential costs
with respect to targeting harms in predictable and troubling
patterns. One way of understanding the central claim of the
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defendant in Whren is that the police use of traffic
violations as probable cause to justify the investigation of
other suspected offenses (such as drug offenses) imposes
the costs of law enforcement on a group that is
demographically aggregated in a predictable way. The costs
are even higher when the aggregation occurs at the
intersection
of
demography
and
geography.
This
aggregation phenomenon helps to “race” crime in a
132
particular way.
B. Evidence of Racing Crime
And the best available evidence suggests that this
racing effect is a real problem today. The data and analyses
on police stops consistently reveal disproportionate stops of
African-Americans and Hispanics. The evidence is
overwhelming.
In 2007, the RAND Corporation issued a report on
the racial disparities in the stop, question, and frisk
practices of the New York City Police Department (NYPD).
Using data on all street encounters between NYPD officers
and pedestrians in 2006, RAND found that although
consistent estimates could not be obtained on any racial
disparities in stop rates (due to the sensitivity of the data to
the type of benchmark used to compare), officers frisked
whites less than they frisked similarly situated nonwhites
(29 percent of stops, compared to 33 percent of stops).
Search rates were roughly the same across races, at 6
percent to 7 percent (although the study notes that in
Staten Island, the search rates of minorities was
significantly greater); officers successfully recovered
contraband less from minorities than similarly situated
whites. Specifically, the success rate for blacks was 5.7
percent, 5.4 percent for Hispanics, and 6.4 percent for
133
whites.
The data and analysis confirmed the earlier studies
of NYPD stops conducted by Jeff Fagan and Andrew
Gelman. They analyzed 125,000 pedestrian stops by the
NYPD from January 1998 to March 1999 and, using
hierarchical multilevel models to adjust for precinct-level
variability, they nevertheless found that African-Americans
and Hispanics were stopped more frequently than whites,
132
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even after controlling for precinct variability and race134
specific estimates of crime participation.
[INSERT GRAPH OF 2006 STOPS IN NYC]
In fact, study after study reveals discrimination. In
August 2008, Professor Ian Ayres of Yale University
published a study on police stops by the Los Angeles Police
Department (LAPD).135 Ayres analyzed data obtained from
over 810,000 “field data reports” collected by the LAPD from
July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004 (field data reports are
completed whenever a police officer makes a pedestrian or
motor vehicle stop). Ayres found that there were more than
4,500 stops per 10,000 African-American residents,
whereas there were only 1,750 stops per 10,000 white
residents. In two neighborhoods, Central and Hollywood,
Ayres actually found that “there were more stops of African
Americans in one year than there were African American
residents, meaning that the average number of stops per
resident was greater than one.”136
Ayres controlled his findings for variables such as
the rate of violent and property crime, and found that the
disparity was not the result of different crime rates in
different areas—the stop rate per 10,000 residents was
3,400 stops higher for Blacks than Whites, and more than
350 stops higher for Hispanics than Whites. Once stopped,
Blacks were 29 percent more likely to get arrested than
Whites, and Hispanics were 32 percent more likely. Police
were 127 percent more likely to frisk or pat down stopped
Blacks than stopped Whites, and 43 percent more likely to
do so for Hispanics. While minorities were more likely to be
stopped and then searched once stopped, the results of
these searches were less productive than comparable
searches with white residents. Searched Blacks were 37
percent less likely to be found with weapons than searched
Whites, 24 percent less likely to be found with drugs, and
25 percent less likely to be found with other contraband.
Similarly, searched Hispanics were 33 percent less likely to
be found with weapons, 34 percent less likely to be found
with drugs, and 12 percent less likely to be found with
other contraband. The race of the stopping officer also
134
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mattered—the disparities found decreased when the officer
was of the same race as the person who was stopped.
A few months earlier, in April 2008, the ACLU of
Arizona released a study analyzing the first full year of data
on highway traffic stops collected under a settlement
agreement with the Arizona Department of Public Safety—
the period spanned July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007.137 The
analysis revealed that patrol officers searched AfricanAmericans, Hispanics, and Native Americans at a higher
rate than Whites or other minorities: Blacks and Hispanics
who were stopped by police were searched 10 percent of the
time and Native Americans 13 percent of the time. By
contrast, Whites, Asians, and Middle Easterners were
searched around 3 to 5 percent of the time. The study
found no evidence to support such differential treatment by
race—on average, 34 percent of Whites searched were
found with contraband, while only 22 percent of Hispanics
searched were found with contraband. Blacks were found
with contraband at similar rates as Whites (38 percent), but
were twice as likely to be searched. Middle Easterners, who
were searched at slightly higher rates than Whites (5
percent, compared to the 4 percent search rate of Whites),
were found with contraband only 24 percent of the time.
Additional evidence of differential racial treatment was
found in the disparity of stop duration by race. Overall,
minorities were held for longer periods during police stops,
excluding stops that involved searches.
In a follow-up study commissioned by the Arizona
Department of Public Safety using an additional six months
of data, the researchers found that, conditional on being
stopped, racial disparities existed in the outcome of the
stop, even after controlling for other explanatory factors.138
Whites were more likely to receive warnings (44.6 percent of
stops) than Blacks (41.3 percent of stops) and Hispanics
(only 33.6 percent of stops). By contrast, Hispanics and
Blacks were more likely to be cited than Whites (48.9
percent for Hispanics, 48.1 percent for Blacks, and 43.4
137
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2008,
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percent for Whites). Hispanics, Blacks, and Native
Americans were all significantly more likely to get searched
or arrested. Whites were arrested only 2.1 percent of the
time, while Native Americans were arrested 5.4 percent of
the time, Blacks 4.2 percent of the time, and Hispanics 3.9
percent of the time). Hispanics were searched at an 8.6
percent rate, Blacks at 7.5 percent, Native Americans at 6.9
percent, and Whites at 3.3 percent. All results were
statistically significant at the .001 level.139 Analysis of the
percentage of searches that successfully found contraband
showed that for non-consent discretionary searches,
searches of Hispanics had the lowest success rates (37.5
percent); in comparison, the success rates were 52.9
percent for Native Americans, 50.4 percent for Whites, 50.0
percent for Blacks, and 46.4 percent for other races.
In February 2009, the state of West Virginia issued
its “Traffic Stop Study” final report for 2008.140 The state
found that on average, Blacks were 1.64 times more likely
to be stopped by police than Whites, and Hispanics were
1.48 times more likely to be stopped than Whites. Blacks
and Hispanics were also more likely to be searched than
Whites, with the rate of being searched at 10.64 percent for
Blacks, 10.24 percent for Hispanics, and 4.32 percent for
Whites. While the rates of being stopped and searched were
higher for minorities, the contraband “hit rates” (the rate at
which contraband is found in a search) were lower. The hit
rate for Blacks was 43.11 percent, 30.23 percent for
Hispanics, and 47.17 percent for Whites. Finally, the rates
of receiving a citation and/or getting arrested were higher
for Blacks (57.34 percent) and Hispanics (60.92 percent)
than for white drivers (46.52 percent). Similar results were
found on data at the county and agency level.
In mid-2009, Alexander Weiss and Dennis P.
Rosenbaum of the University of Illinois at Chicago Center
for Research in Law and Justice issued the 2008 annual
report on traffic stops for the state of Illinois—the fifth
annual traffic stop report based on data collected annually
starting in 2004 required under state law due to allegations
of racial profiling.141 Weiss and Rosenbaum found that
139
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minority drivers were around 13 percent more likely to get
stopped than white drivers. Once stopped, minorities were
around 10 percent more likely to receive a citation.
Specifically, 64 percent of Blacks were cited, 69 percent of
Hispanics, 65 percent of Asians, and 70 percent of Native
Americans, compared to 58 percent of Whites. In terms of
searches, Hispanic drivers were 2.4 times more likely to be
subjected to a consented search than white drivers, and
black drivers 3 times more likely. While minorities were
about 2.5 times more likely to be searched than Whites,
they were less likely to be found with contraband. Searches
of white drivers turned up contraband 24.4 percent of the
time, while searches of minorities did so only 15.1 percent
of the time—in other words, police were searching
minorities more even though searches of Whites found
contraband 1.6 times more than searches of minorities.142
These reports extend a long and consistent history of
studies documenting racial profiling in American policing
across the country. Earlier in 2007, for instance, the RAND
Corporation had issued its report on racial disparities in
the stop, question, and frisk practices of the New York City
Police Department.143 And a year earlier, in 2006, the
Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice had
issued a report on traffic stop disparities in Rhode Island.144
The study found that minorities were subjected to searches
at over twice the rate compared to Whites (13.6 percent for
minorities, 6.3 percent for Whites). Limiting the data to only
discretionary searches (searches not incident to a lawful
arrest) still found minorities being searched at twice the
rate of Whites, with minorities being searched at 5.9
percent and Whites being searched at 2.9 percent.145 While
minorities were searched at twice the rate as Whites, the
productivity of searches was less for minorities than
Whites. For discretionary searches, Whites had a 26.5
percent hit rate, while minorities had a 22.3 percent hit
rate.146
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More recently, on June 30, 2009, the ACLU released
its report to the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination: The Persistence of Racial and Ethnic
Profiling in the United States.147 The report catalogued the
independent and ACLU-based evidence of racial profiling in
22 states and the federal government, describing in an
intricate and detailed 98-page report all the evidence for
racial profiling by state and local law enforcement. The
report concluded that both data and anecdotal evidence
revealed that minorities in the United States are being
subjected to racial profiling in spite of the numerous public
statements by state and federal government officials that
the practice of racial profiling should end. Anecdotal
examples of racial profiling—such as the illegal deportation
of a cognitively impaired U.S. citizen from Los Angeles
because officials did not believe he could possibly be a
citizen148 or Detroit police officers accused of conducting
bare-hand searches of genitals on a number of young black
males149—were supported by analyses of state level data
from Minnesota to California finding consistent patterns of
racial minorities being over-stopped, over-searched, and
over-frisked in comparison to Whites.150
C. Other Costs of “Individualized Suspicion”
There are additional differences between “individual
suspicion”-based stops and checkpoints. If we define
autonomy costs as the length of detainment, the amount of
time any one person spends in a checkpoint tends to be
shorter than the typical suspicion-based stop. The
checkpoint also limits discretion in another way—by
enhancing the political accountability of policing agencies
to the people who are policed.
The primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to
curtail, constrain, and shape police discretion, and only
randomization fulfils that function. As the graphs above
demonstrate, the more likely it is that the typical person
who encounters the police in a checkpoint reflects the
median voter in a given community, the more likely it is
that police will be attentive to the demands of that voter
147
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when shaping and developing policy. Discretion constraint
plus enhanced accountability help ensure that checkpoints
satisfy Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
The additive impact of these benefits will lead, we
think, to fewer illegitimate invasions of individual autonomy
and privacy. Moreover, we should expect law enforcement
agencies to be more effective and efficient. Even if the same
number of people may be stopped that are stopped today,
they will be stopped for shorter period of time and for the
purposes of enhancing more accurate targeting if and when
suspicion-based engagement is appropriate. Because the
suspicion-based stops will be more accurate, fewer people
will be wrongfully stopped.
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D. Ensuring Privacy Interests
Many may object that our approach does not
adequately protect the value of privacy at the heart of the
Fourth Amendment. As Justice O’Connor and others have
repeatedly
stated,
“Protection
of
privacy,
not
evenhandedness, was then and is now the touchstone of
151
That objection, however, is
the Fourth Amendment.”
mistaken.
We disagree. Under our scheme, privacy is protected
by requiring a certain level of suspicion. What we propose is
to have our cake and eat it, too: to have privacy and
evenhandedness. The two constitutional values are not
mutually exclusive or in a zero-sum contest.
The point is best illustrated, actually, by returning to
the precise discussion of this issue by Justice O’Connor in
the public school randomized drug-testing case—precisely
where she inveighs against evenhandedness. Justice
O’Connor is discussing and embracing an original intent
analysis of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the
question of searching shops and vessels on the sea.
O’Connor notes that, most telling of all, “the particular way
the Framers chose to curb the abuses of general warrants—
and by implication, all general searches—was not to impose
a novel ‘evenhandedness’ requirement; it was to retain the
individualized suspicion requirement contained in the
typical general warrant, but to make that requirement
meaningful and enforceable, for instance, by raising the
required level of individualized suspicion to objective
152
probable cause.”
O’Connor then turns to the example of the original
congressional authorization regarding duty collector’s
searches of possibly concealed goods subject to import
duties. There, warrants were required in the case of any
search on land; however, for searches at sea, warrants were
dispensed with but Congress nevertheless “limited officials
to searching only those ships and vessels ‘in which [a
collector] shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or
153
merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.’”
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O’Connor maintains that it is precisely this
requirement of suspicion that protected privacy. O’Connor
writes:
True, not all searches around the time the Fourth
Amendment was adopted required individualized
suspicion—although most did. A search incident to
arrest was an obvious example of one that did not,
but even those searches shared the essential
characteristics that distinguish suspicion-based
searches from abusive general searches: they only
"affect one person at a time," Krull, 480 U.S. at 365
(O'Connor, J., dissenting), and they are generally
avoidable by refraining from wrongdoing. Protection
of privacy, not evenhandedness, was then and is now
154
the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment.
It is precisely the fact that there is suspicion that
satisfies privacy requirements. And evenhandedness is no
substitute for the protection of privacy, the Court has
emphasized. Justice O’Connor writes:
The Court clearly indicated that evenhanded
treatment was no substitute for the individualized
suspicion requirement: “It would be intolerable and
unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized
to stop every automobile on the chance of finding
liquor and thus subject all persons lawfully using the
highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such
155
a search.”
We fully embrace this reasoning: We are not arguing
for evenhandedness as a substitute to suspicion, but as a
complement to privacy.
We are not asking for suspicionless randomized
searches. On the contrary, we want the level of suspicion
spelled out. By ensuring a minimum level of suspicion, we
ensure the protection of privacy. Our argument, in essence,
is that the entire process of weighing governmental
interests against privacy interests is a charade and that it
can be replaced, very simply, by a determination of the
threshold level of probable culpability tied to a level of
offense. And we believe that this can be achieved in
practice.
E. Measuring Suspicion
154
155
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Id. at 668-69.
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As we have demonstrated elsewhere, it is in fact
possible to measure the level of suspicion associated with
group-traits and to assess whether that level of suspicion
satisfies a constitutional standard—assuming that the
Supreme Court were to articulate such a standard in
156
probabilistic terms. Our earlier discussion was set in the
context of the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v.
Wardlow,157 where the Court was asked to determine
whether a police officer’s stop of a suspect, after the
suspect fled upon seeing several police cruisers patrolling
an area known for heavy narcotics trafficking, violated the
Fourth Amendment. The Court, in a 5-to-4 decision,
decided that the stop was constitutional, and reversed the
Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to the contrary.
The way we framed the case was to explore,
empirically, whether flight from the police is really a good
indicator of guilt; and what we attempted to show is that
there actually was good evidence to guide the resolution of
that question. Neither the majority nor the dissent looked to
empirical evidence in Wardlow, choosing instead to answer
the question with reference to commonsense judgments.
What we tried to show, by contrast, was that the
constitutional issue was precisely the kind of question for
which there may have been an empirical answer.
In particular, we turned to a pathbreaking study of
street stops in New York City released on December 1,
1999—about six weeks before Wardlow was published.158
The New York OAG study was an analysis of 175,000 forms
collected over one year, using as well census data, crime
statistics, and demographic information to yield a
statistically valid, quantitative view of the practice of “stop
and frisk.”159 The New York OAG Report collected, in
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addition to racial breakdowns on stops and frisks, a
measure of how “good” those stops were: how many of the
stops led to an arrest. Citywide, that ratio was 9:1.160 That
is, nine stops were made by the NYPD for every arrest.161
But the OAG Report contained more fine-grained
information. The study collected information on a sample of
stops162 based on facts that, as reported by the police,
clearly met the constitutional standard of reasonable
suspicion according to Terry and its progeny.163
Additionally, the study collected information on stops based
on facts that courts have decided clearly do not constitute
reasonable suspicion.164 Moreover, the report collected
information pertinent to the very facts in Wardlow—
suspects who flee from the police in high crime areas. The
table on the following page summarizes the OAG Report.
With respect to the particular issue presented in
Wardlow, the chart provides a fascinating picture of police
work. Stops reported as undertaken because the suspect
fled the scene result in a high stop-to-arrest ratio—a ratio
of 26:1. That ratio is quite close to that of stops based on
factors generally understood to fail to satisfy reasonable
suspicion under the Fourth Amendment. Note that even
when flight in a high crime area is considered, the ratio
between stops and arrests lowers, but it does not lower by
much. It stands at 20.3:1. (These data support the Wardlow
dissenters’ argument that flight may be caused by a whole
host of reasons that are not indicative of criminal activity.)
Importantly, however, the Wardlow Court did not
discuss merely the suspicious nature of flight generally;
rather, the Court assessed whether flight “upon noticing the
police”165 or “flight [that] was motivated by the presence of a
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police officer”166 was suspicious enough to justify a police
stop. The researchers who analyzed the data in the New
York OAG Report categorized this more specialized type of
flight in a category separate from the general flight category.
The ratio between stops and arrests with respect to flight to
elude the police suggest a tighter relationship than the
general flight code. Indeed the 15.8:1 ratio of stops to
arrests for this category is quite close to the ratio of the
other categories of information for stops deemed insufficient
to
determine
constitutionality
with
confidence—an
indication that Wardlow is indeed the close case that it
appears on first impression to be. When the data on flight
to elude police are confined to high crime areas—the very
context presented by the facts in Wardlow—a different
relationship between stops and arrests emerges. But not
what one would expect! These data reveal a stop-to-arrest
ratio of 45:1.
Table: Summary of the OAG Report

Facts articulate
reasonable
suspiciona
Facts do not
articulate
reasonable
suspicionb
Insufficient
informationc

Total Stops

Stops
Resulting in
Arrest

Ratio of Stops
to Arrest

2,678

368

7.3

673

23

29.3

1,032

76

13.6

104

4

26

79

5

15.8

Flight Aloned
Fleeing crime
scene
Attempted flight
Flight in High
Crime Area
Fleeing crime

166
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scene

61

3

20.3

Attempted flight

45

1

45

4,383

467

9.4

Total167
and

This astoundingly high relationship between stops
arrests is suggestive that in high-crime urban

167

Explanatory notes for categories above:
The researchers considered these categories of information reported by an
officer as evidence meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard:
crime observed (observed drug sale, jumping turnstile/metrocard fraud, theft of
service, buy & bust, graffiti); fit description (fit description,
identified/information from third party at scene, bail jumping, known and
wanted by police/active warrant); weapon observed (waistband activity, bulge in
waistband, observed object that could be (appeared to be) gun weapon, laser
light activity/toy guns); suspicious plus (eluding the police plus other factors,
location prone to robbery plus suspicious behavior (pacing, talking to known
dealers,
loitering),
carrying
theft
equipment/other
paraphenalia,
placing/retrieving object (drugs), location known for drug activity plus
“suspicious behavior” (pacing, standing around talking with passersby or known
drug dealers), location known for prostitution plus suspicious behavior,
suspected break-in/burglary/on fire escape, extended observation of suspicious
activity (trying multiple car doors, extended observation activity, walking back
and forth on same street for period of time, etc.).

a

b

The researchers considered these categories of information reported by an
officer as evidence not meeting the reasonable suspicion justificatory standard,
rendering the reported stop unconstitutional: Activity deemed suspicious
(pocket/clothing activity, bulge in clothing, attempting to elude police,
suspicious behavior (nervousness, pacing), suspicious clothing, association with
a suspect/person arrested/known dealer, gang affiliation (known member or
clothing), loitering, known to police, loitering on subway platform, looking in to
parked cars/trying one door, black or silver object/exchange of object; wrong
place (location (out of place), location known for drug activity, location prone to
robbery/burglary/grand larceny, location known for prostitution.
c

The researchers considered these categories of information reported by an
officer as evidence insufficient to determine whether or not meeting the
reasonable suspicion standard was met: person in area that crime or suspicious
activity was reported, fleeing crime scene, suspected drug sale, observed drug
use, suspected alcohol consumption/open bottle, observed alcohol
consumption/open bottle, moving furniture/carrying out of place objects
(computers), panhandling, insufficient information, knife in pocket, questioned
individual in an ongoing investigation.

d
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The data on flight were categorized in two ways: attempting to elude police,
eluding police plus other factors/suspicious activity, and fleeing the crime scene.
The researchers considered information relevant to the first category evidence of
an unconstitutional stop, and they considered evidence relevant to the second
category insufficient to make a determination. We are grateful to Jeffrey Fagan,
Center for Violence Research and Prevention, Columbia University for the
analysis of stops and arrests based on the flight codes.
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communities where the population is disproportionately
minority, flight from an identifiable police officer is a very
poor indicator that crime is afoot. But more importantly, for
our purposes here, the data suggest that it is possible to
measure the level of suspicion attaching to group-based
categories. The data in the chart above provide a
comparative measure of the intrusiveness of police stops for
different categories of reasons.
The difficulty, of course, is that the Supreme Court
has never used exact proportions to explain the level of
certainty a police officer must possess under the
reasonableness approach.168 Our point is that this
169
deficiency can be cured.

168

Rather than emphasizing a particular quantum of evidence necessary to
justify a stop under the reasonable suspicion standard, the Court has emphasized
the factual basis for the stop by requiring an officer to review all those factors
that motivated him to act. See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 (1981).
Despite the Court’s reluctance to discuss the level of certainty probabilistically,
there is evidence that decision-makers assess the level of evidence that justifies
different police actions in implicit probabilistic terms. For example, in one
study, 96 out of 166 federal judges surveyed indicated a belief that the
reasonable suspicion standard requires 40 percent certainty or less that evidence
of crime would be found by an officer after a stop. See C.M.A. McCauliff,
Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional
Guarantees? 35 Vand. L. Rev. 1293, 1327 tbl. 3 (1982). In the same study, 25
percent of the judges indicated that 50% certainty was necessary for reasonable
suspicion, while another 19 percent indicated that 60 percent certainty or more
was necessary. This empirical evidence makes it quite clear that Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence leaves open just how much liberty should be
circumscribed.
169

We would also suggest that, for serious crime, the level of suspicion could be
lower than for trivial offenses or misdemeanors. If the offense is in fact trivial,
perhaps we should augment the level of suspicion, in part because the triviality
of the offense in all likelihood suggests that the general level of offending in
society is probably higher. There is a sense in which we do that, intuitively, in
many criminal contexts. In the case of conspiracy, for example, we require a
higher level of evidence of intentionality to support a conspiracy or complicity
charge. So, for example, when an individual who provides telephone message
service to the public is accused of conspiring with prostitutes, we may require
more evidence of intentional aiding in order to prove a conspiracy. We may not
be as willing to impute intent based on knowledge—based on the fact that the
telephone message provider simply knows that his customers include prostitutes.
However, we may be willing to impute intent if an individual is accused of
facilitating a terrorist act if, with knowledge, that individual sells a service that
furthers the terrorist act. This is, famously, the distinction drawn in the Lauria
case. See People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (Cal. District Ct App. 1967)
(greater level of evidence of intent required in conspiracy case involving
prostitution). The same type of distinction may apply in the Fourth Amendment
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V. Implementation Challenges and Some Objections
It is crucial to compare and evaluate different Fourth
Amendment approaches against the appropriate baseline.
That baseline is how police power is exercised today, not in
some idealized world. We need to compare our proposal to
actual police practices, not perfect or idealized possibilities.
And while we may well agree that checkpoints might be
intolerable in an idealized world, that world is not the one
in which we live. The issue is whether the evenhandedness
of randomized policing may improve the current situation,
and here we believe that the answer is yes.
A. Models of Suspicion-sufficient Randomized Policing
Before addressing some objections, though, let us be
more precise about the exact kind of policing that we are
proposing. Here are five examples of randomized police
practices that we believe would satisfy constitutional values
and improve on current police practices by promoting
evenhandedness while ensuring the protection of legitimate
privacy interests.
(1)
Randomized consent searches on the highway:
Rather than allow the police to use profiles and hunches to
seek consent to search on the highway, highway patrol
officers would be instructed to seek consent to search
vehicles in every third or fifth (or, if they have the time,
every) stop of a vehicle traveling at a designated speed, for
instance, 90 to 95 miles per hour on even days and 85 to
90 mph on odd days. The evidence from traffic stops across
the country suggests that, as the amount of discretion in
the stopping and searching decreases, the racial
170
This
disproportionality of the stops also decreases.
randomized approach would protect privacy, since it is
based on a traffic violation (excessive speeding), and at the
same time ensure evenhandedness.
(2)
Randomized evening street stops-and-frisks in
diverse socio-economic neighborhoods: Instead of allowing
targeted stop-and-frisk activity in minority, high-risk
neighborhoods only, urban police officers would be
instructed to conduct evening stop-and-frisks in, say, five
different neighborhoods of diverse socio-economic and
demographic composition. In each location, police officers
would be asked to stake out a block or intersection and
context: we may require a higher threshold of suspicion in the case of more
ordinary misdemeanors or more trivial felonies.
170
See expert report in Desoto NJ case.
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then to stop, interview, and frisk each tenth (or fifth or
twentieth, depending on traffic) person who walks by them.
Police officers would hand each person searched a card
with information about the search program. If the search
program did not net the requisite level of suspicious activity
(including drug contraband, firearms, etc.), then all persons
searched under the program would be entitled to monetary
compensation. As in all large metropolitan areas today,
police would fill out a contact card for each stop-and-frisk
encounter, which would make data collection very easy.
(3)
Randomized subway and bus searches of bags
and pat-down: Here too, the idea would be to substitute a
randomized program for the type of more targeted antiterrorism searches of bags in the subway post 9/11. Again,
the police would be directed to locate themselves in such a
way as to diversify the populations that they encounter. The
searches would be conducted on a random basis (fifth,
tenth, or twentieth person entering the station or boarding
the bus) and would be accompanied by an information card
in the event that the search program does not meet the
threshold requirement of suspicion.
(4)
Randomized DUI roadblocks: These would
involve randomized administration of breathalyzer tests at
roadblocks located at various diverse neighborhoods in the
city or along roads in diverse rural areas. These too would
be monitored and evaluated on a monthly basis and subject
to the requirement that information be distributed for
eventual compensation if the level of DUI detection falls
below the minimum level of suspicion.
(5)
Randomized investigation of trades on any
stock for which there is an important disclosure of good or
bad corporate news: Here, federal investigators would
randomly select and investigate persons who bought or sold
a quantity of shares in a company that, within a certain
period of the trade, announces significant news affecting
the stock price. The investigation could include the power of
subpoena for phone records, etc.
These are just five examples, naturally, and the list
could go on, for example, to include random IRS audits,
immigration checks, or even random computer scans for
illegal downloads or child pornography.
We suspect that you may be saying to yourself that
these police practices seem extreme and somewhat
totalitarian. You may think that people will think they are
unfair and illiberal, even perhaps un-American—that we
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have forgotten the lessons of the American Revolution. (Or
something to that effect.) Our response may sound
condescending, and for that we apologize (especially to our
readers who may have extensive or other experience with
police searches). But here we go anyway: the reason that
you may be having that response, very likely, is because
you may be part of an elite in the United States that is
relatively sheltered from police stops and frisks. But for
most young men living in the inner-city, this is the
American experience. Let’s remember that in 2008 the
NYPD stopped and frisked 531,159 individuals, and that
about 90 percent of those stops and frisks resulted in no
arrest or summons. That is half a million stop and frisks.
Now many of us have not experienced those kinds of police
practices because many of us are not the “usual suspects.”
But for many youth in poor urban neighborhoods, being
stopped and frisked is a common experience. What we are
proposing, in effect, is simply to distribute more
evenhandedly the burden of making us all safe and secure.

B. Compensation Questions
There is, today, no system of compensation for
wrongful searches and the existing mechanisms to police
the Fourth Amendment—predominantly Section 1983 civil
rights suits—are inadequate to the task.
We propose compensation primarily because the
level of suspicion for randomized search programs often will
be difficult to ascertain ex ante, before the search program
has been implemented. Under these circumstances, we
believe that persons who are subject to randomized
searches where there is ultimately an insufficient level of
suspicion should be compensated for their time and
inconvenience;
by
contrast,
individuals
who
are
inconvenienced at a proper checkpoint, where there is
ultimately
sufficient
suspicion,
should
view
the
inconvenience as part of their civic obligations to ensure
safety for all. We also propose compensation in order to
incentivize the police to achieve the minimum level of
suspicion that would be eventually set by the Supreme
Court.
Under our proposal, a police department would only
need to compensate individuals wrongfully searched (i.e.
not arrested or fined) at a checkpoint if the overall level of
suspicion at that checkpoint did not reach the minimum
constitutional level required. In all cases where the
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randomized search program does achieve the base level of
successful searches, individuals at those checkpoints would
not be compensated. Moreover, as discussed further below,
individuals who are wrongfully searched outside the context
of a checkpoint would also automatically be entitled to
compensation with an additional penalty for their targeted
harm.
Compensation is not without its problems. First, it
may create some moral hazards. It is possible, for instance,
that some people will be drawn to checkpoints in order to
receive compensation, which would effectively reduce the
hit rate at the checkpoint and make compensation even
more likely. Second, the compensation scheme may also
make the entire policy seem more unfair if compensation is
being awarded in the higher-income neighborhoods
(because of lower hit rates) and not in the inner-city
neighborhoods (because of higher hit rates). This latter
point would militate in favor of not awarding compensation
based on the hit rate and level of suspicion, but instead to
all persons who are wrongly searched. Third, compensation
may reduce the positive effects of policing since it
represents a cost that will have to be internalized by the
policing budget. There will be costs associated with the
compensation scheme, including not only the compensation
itself, but also administration, notification, disputes over
claims, etc. If the costs are high, it may reduce the number
of people that can be searched, which will further reduce
the effects of policing—perhaps, the total level of deterrence,
incapacitation, or retribution. In other words, there will be
costs associated with any such program that may take
away from the benefits.
These problems are by no means trivial. However,
they need to be weighed against the important goal of
ensuring evenhandedness in our policing. The turn to
randomization means that certain policing programs will
need to be implemented without ex ante knowledge of the
exact level of suspicion and that calls for compensation for
those who are burdened by those unsuccessful programs.
We believe that some of the administrative costs will be
absorbed by the new record-keeping requirements—in other
words, there will be some economies of scale given current
oversight. In most large metropolitan areas, the police are
already required to gather information for each stop and
frisk. Each time a police officer searches a suspect, they are
already required to fill out a form. As a result, the
information gathering and dissemination associated with a
potential compensation scheme should not increase those
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costs much. Moreover, there may be less civil rights
litigation as a result of a more routine compensation
scheme—in the same way that workman’s compensation
schemes decrease some litigation costs. But there is no
question that, overall, the very fact of compensation will
increase costs. There is no easy way out of this dilemma. It
has to be that we, as a society, value the benefits of
evenhandedness enough to outweigh those costs and are
thereby willing to invest additional resources into the
problem.
C. Pooling Issues
One of the largest issues in terms of implementation
concerns how the pools of individuals will be constructed
for purposes of randomization. As the illustrations above
suggest, most of the pooling that we envisage will be
determined by space and time, rather than by additional
group traits. In other words, instead of randomizing within
a suspect group-trait, we propose randomizing by location
and time. As a result, the pooling issues will be determined
by the location of the checkpoint at the particular subway
stop or street intersection and by the time of day.
D. Some Objections
It is important to emphasize a few points before
addressing some recurring objections.
First, using the checkpoint as the Fourth
Amendment loadstar would not mean that the police could
not also engage in the more traditional police practices of
stopping and searching a suspect who is walking out of a
bank with a ski mask over his face and a bag full of money.
The constitutionalization of a randomization paradigm
would not make it necessary to stop and search everyone
surrounding the bank. It would not necessitate
randomization in more conventional Warrant Model
situations.
If the police have a compelling reason to stop a
suspect outside of a randomized program, then that stop
would be treated as if it had an n of 1. If the search does
not produce anything, then the individual must be
compensated, and perhaps compensated at a higher rate
than for randomization programs that do not reach the
designated level of suspicion because the targeted harm to
the profiled individual searched is greater. Since there is no
randomization program in place here, and no other search
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results to aggregate, the search must compensated if
unsuccessful.
Second, there is no doubt that using checkpoints will
not, by itself, cure all the evils of racial profiling. So, for
instance, if the police set up their roadblocks all on the
South Side of Chicago or only in African-American
neighborhoods, the distribution of arrests will inevitably be
skewed along racial and socio-economic lines, very much
like it is under the Whren model. Similarly, if the police use
as their randomizing variable one that correlates with race,
the police will be functionally profiling on race.
However, there are reasons to believe that these
problems would be minimized under a random search
paradigm—for two reasons in particular. First, the police
themselves have an incentive to distribute searches widely
so as to police all neighborhoods in the city, not just the atrisk neighborhoods. In order for the police administrators to
have an effective police force throughout the city, they will
have to set up randomized search programs in diverse
neighborhoods. If they limit themselves to targeted policing
for the lower-crime neighborhoods, they will be subjecting
themselves to far greater costs of compensation, since each
wrongful search will have to be compensated, and perhaps
compensated even more if there is an added price to
targeted harms. So in order to ensure police protection
across the city, the police administrators will need to
171
distribute search programs throughout the city.
Second, distributing the burden of policing within
neighborhoods would put political pressure on the city to
distribute the burden more widely throughout the city. The
wider distribution of the costs of policing, even within a
neighborhood, and the resulting political pressure that the
wider distribution will trigger, will likely put pressure on
city administrators to distribute more widely the costs of
policing. Even within a socio-economically depressed
neighborhood, traditional forms of profiling are condoned in
large part because they fall on the most marginalized
171

To be sure, the police today also have an incentive to police the entire city,
they do police all neighborhoods, and despite that, they target stops and frisks
disproportionately on certain groups and in certain neighborhoods. The problem
today is not that the police do not police higher-income neighborhoods, but that
they target their stops-and-frisks on certain identifiable populations and in
certain parts of town. Under our scheme, the practices would be made more
consistent across neighborhoods. It is the consistency in practices that would
make all the difference. The police would have the same incentive to police all
neighborhoods, but would be required to do so in the same way.
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populations in that neighborhood. By distributing the costs
more widely, there is likely to be greater attention to any
neighborhood-to-neighborhood disparities in the burden of
172
policing.
Let us turn then to some objections.
First, a reader may object that profiling is more
efficient than randomized searching and that there is no
reason to search low-probability suspects at checkpoints.
This is a common reaction to our proposal and it can be
expressed along any of the dimensions of policing that we
discuss—whether it involves searching grannies and
toddlers at the airport or auditing low-income taxpayers on
April 16th. This argument from efficiency, however, is
misplaced for a number of reasons.
The first reason is that, as a practical matter,
profiling and statistical discrimination likely increase the
overall rates of the targeted crime under the conservative
assumption that the targeted population is less elastic than
the non-profiled group. There are long-term substitution
effects and a ratchet effect on the profiled group that, in all
likelihood, is counter-productive to the law enforcement
goal of fighting crime. In other words, profiling is not likely
to be more efficient. One of us has dedicated a full length
173
treatment to this point and we will not rehash it here. The
basic point here is that we cannot be so sure about the
efficiency gains of profiling and therefore that we should not
be so willing to trade-off the distributional concerns and the
problems of subordination.
The second reason, though, is equally important: we
are not dealing with public policy in this essay, but with
constitutional interpretation. There is no reason to believe,
ex ante, that the constitutional values we hold so dear
coincide with the most effective policing techniques. There
is no necessary overlap of the Constitution on one hand
and public policy on the other. Or to say this in another
way, it is possible that the new constitutional paradigm
may allow, as a constitutional matter, some policing
172

Here too, naturally, the greater diffusion of searches may trigger political
resistance in the more affluent neighborhoods; however, it is hard to imagine
that any neighborhood would want to do without policing. Policing is, after all, a
“good” and tends to be viewed as a desirable public service. Once again, the
consistency in the police practices is what would serve to distribute the burdens
of policing.
173
See Harcourt, Against Prediction, 2007.
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practices that we do not embrace as a policy matter—and
vice versa. Efficiency is not the litmus test of constitutional
interpretation. Now, in this particular case, we believe that
suspicion-sufficient randomized search program not only
would satisfy the constitutional values of evenhandedness
and privacy-protection, but would also be wise public
policy. We believe that the embrace of randomization would
not only promote the kind of evenhandedness that will
ultimately reduce bias and the disparate racial impact of
policing, but also improve our policing practices. However,
we would argue for this constitutional change even if it did
have costs in efficiency.
One further point on this matter. One may not
believe that the courts and constitutional interpretation are
necessarily the right device to use to address the
fundamental problem of racial injustice in police patrolling.
Undoubtedly, it would be better to look elsewhere than
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The rate of review is low and
review comes late, plus the consequences of violations are
largely insured against today, with immunities for police
officers, etc. It is undoubtedly true that the values of the
Fourth Amendment—privacy and evenhandedness—could
be better implemented through administrative measures
within police forces that reward (or punish) officers or
supervisors for disparate hit rates along race lines, for
instance. We do not argue, however, that there should be
exclusive reliance on the courts or that the constitutional
standard we advocate is a better way of achieving a less
biased society. We are simply dealing in this essay with the
constitutional standard to apply. In other words, even if one
does not think that the courts are the best or even a good
vehicle, one would want the constitutional standard to
reflect
the
values
we
hold
dear—privacy
and
evenhandedness. Our central point is that it is rarely
related to issues of evenhandedness—and that is something
we seek to redress.
Second, some readers may object that there are
really two separate projects here: one involves abandoning
the “individualized suspicion” standard, the other
embracing randomization, and the two are not necessarily
related to each other. Our response is that they are
inextricably linked. The reason is that once you abandon
the “individualized suspicion” standard and adopt a
requirement that searches achieve a designated level of
suspicion, it is important to then introduce the element of
evenhandedness. It is important, in effect, to limit the focus
on suspicion so that it does not have devastating
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distributional and subordinating consequences. In other
words, we should not seek to simply increase as much as
possible the level of suspicion (which protects only privacy),
but should simultaneously, over a certain level of suspicion,
protect the other value of evenhandedness at the heart of
the Fourth Amendment.
Third and finally, some readers may object that the
overall result might be too little policing. Assuming with
Randall Kennedy and others that policing is a “good,” some
may argue that requiring checkpoints in high-income
neighborhoods will incentivize the more politically powerful
elites to minimize policing, which would effectively reduce
the amount of policing in high-crime neighborhoods below
the levels required there for safety and protection. The fear
here is not that the randomized searches would be too
oppressive, but rather that there would not be enough of
them. Our answer here is simple: it is unlikely that a
constitutional standard, alone, will resolve all public policy
questions and achieve a perfect equilibrium of policing in
society. There may in fact be slight deviations from
perfection. But we should not expect the constitutional
standard to achieve perfection. It pushes in the right
direction, we believe, and that is far better than the system
that we have in place now. We need to compare what we are
proposing against the reality of today’s policing.
E. Apples to Apples
To be sure, there are some implementation
challenges. But again, that is equally, if not more true in
the case of “individual suspicion” searches. The challenges
there are well illustrated, again, in the Edmond case. For
what that case demonstrates well is that the
constitutionality of a search under the “individualized
suspicion” model is likely to turn on the judge’s decision
whether to evaluate the search program at the level of the
entire roadblock program or at the level of an individual
stop. Judge Posner made this clear in the very first
paragraphs of the opinion: if the court were to adopt a
program-level analysis, Judge Posner suggested, then the
court would perform a cost-benefit analysis and the
outcome would most certainly favor law enforcement. Most
program-level evaluations of costs and benefits do. But if
the court were to adopt an individual-level assessment
focused on “individualized suspicion,” the outcome would
likely differ. Judge Posner wrote:
Whether the seizures effected by Indianapolis’s drug
roadblocks are reasonable may depend on whether
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reasonableness is to be assessed at the level of the
entire program or of the individual stop. If the
former, these roadblocks probably are legal, given
the high “hit” rate and the only modestly intrusive
character of the stops.174
In this sense, the distinction between program-level
and individual-level analyses tends to be outcome
determinative
under
the
“individualized
suspicion”
approach. The program-level assessment triggers a costbenefit analysis that, under Judge Posner’s analysis, favors
law enforcement in practically all cases. The major cost in
the case of the Indianapolis roadblocks was the waste of
time and invasion of privacy suffered by each person
stopped and questioned; other costs included the
opportunity cost of using those police officers on more
pressing police business—such as solving or preventing
serious crimes like murder or robbery—the equipment costs
associated with setting up a barricade, and the costs of
publicizing and justifying the intervention (maybe the police
department had to issue a press release and conduct a
press hearing, etc.). The benefits of the program included
the detection of drug contraband, the detection of derelict
drivers who either had no registration or no licenses, and
the deterrent effect on illicit drug consumption associated
with the publicity surrounding the program—what Judge
Posner referred to, earlier, as “the deterrence of drug
offenses produced by these hits.”175 A program-level costbenefit analysis would compare the aggregated costs and
benefits. As Judge Posner suggested, at the program level
the equation would likely favor the roadblocks because of
the supposedly large deterrent effects.176
174

Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 (majority).
Id. at 662.
176
Id. Judge Posner held that in conventional criminal law enforcement settings,
an individual-level assessment is ordinarily appropriate: “courts do not usually
assess reasonableness at the program level when they are dealing with searches
related to general criminal law enforcement”—or at least, “ordinarily” so. Judge
Posner, reviewing prior cases, found several exceptions to the ordinary situation.
Those exceptions included, first, the case where police officers have information
that a dangerous criminal is escaping along a certain route. Here, there is
heightened risk that allows for preemption in favor of program-level review.
Second, there is an exception when law enforcement face a terrorist threat.
Judge Posner offered the following example: “if the Indianapolis police had a
credible tip that a car loaded with dynamite and driven by an unidentified
terrorist was en route to downtown Indianapolis, they would not be violating the
Constitution if they blocked all the roads to the downtown area even though this
would amount to stopping thousands of drivers without suspecting any one of
them of criminal activity.” Id. at 663. In this case of national emergency, the
court should switch to the program-level review. Judge Posner identified a third
exception for regulatory measures such as sobriety checkpoints or other
175
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Under our proposed approach, checkpoint searches
would be analyzed on a program-level basis, but the use of
a program-level approach would not necessarily bias the
determination in the direction of rubberstamping all
checkpoints. The determination of the constitutionality of
the checkpoint would stand or fall instead on the rate of
success of the police intervention—in other words, on
whether the level of detection satisfied the minimum
requirement of reasonable suspicion set by the Supreme
Court as the probability of detection of crime. Each
checkpoint, then, would have to be evaluated, either ex ante
or ex post, based on the level of detection of crime that is
achieved at the checkpoint in relation to the level of
detection that society considers necessary to satisfy Fourth
Amendment reasonableness.
Since it is practically impossible to know ahead of
time the exact level of detection that is likely in many
situations, a checkpoint model of policing would need to go
hand-in-hand with a compensation framework for the set of
individuals burdened by an unreasonable checkpoint
search.

VI. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has tailored Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence to fit the exception. The cases that best fit
the notion of “individualized suspicion” are those rare cases
in which police attempt to track down clearly identified
assailants, where evidence of the committed crime is
plentiful, and where it converges on one individual. But
such cases are truly exceptional. The more typical policing
situation is one in which the relevant officers have no idea
who the offenders are and rarely know the specific crime
that has been committed. The typical case is about
hunches, guesses, and intuitions about crime—cases in
which police attempt to prevent crime as opposed to
investigating crime that has been committed. These cases
represent the vast majority of policing, and the Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that the Court has developed
simply does not fit this vast majority of cases. As a result,
randomized search programs involving drug testing for law enforcement officers
or railroad engineers; and a fourth exception for immigration checkpoints
searching for illegal immigrants or contraband crossing the borders. In all these
exceptional cases, Judge Posner declared, courts reviewing police practices
should and do properly adopt a program-level cost-benefit analysis—which, not
surprisingly, results in their being found constitutional.
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the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is not able to
ensure the constitutional values that we hold most dear—
limiting discretion, reducing racial discrimination, and
promoting autonomy in interactions that citizens have with
law enforcement agents.
It is time to discard the “individualized suspicion”
standard. The expression is a misleading, conclusory, and
substantively contentless term, which has distorted Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. It has become, over time, a
substitute for the expression “reasonable suspicion” to the
detriment of constitutional interpretation because it has
distracted courts and other criminal justice actors from
focusing on what is truly important—namely, the level, the
amount, the degree of reliable suspicion. Thus, instead of
helping to guide relevant legal system actors to determine
the quantity of suspicion necessary for government action
in particular cases, the term “individualized suspicion” has
functioned as a legal rubric that masks the actual basis of
the judicial decision. It captures, essentially, the
conclusion—namely, that the search is constitutional—
without offering any reasoning.
The central impulse at the heart of this essay is the
desire to cabin police discretion so as to avoid socioeconomic and racial discrimination, and to distribute more
evenly the costs of policing throughout society. The legal
concept of “individualized suspicion” does not advance
either of these two goals—and does not have any other
redeeming virtue. It is, in essence, a semantic hat-trick that
masks the underlying factors that produce a constitutional
conclusion. The concept of “individualized suspicion” needs
to be abandoned, and we need instead to explore the
virtues of randomization that are at the core of the
checkpoint paradigm.
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